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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has two distinct themes, both revolving around issues of collective action. 
The first investigates the impact of partial cooperation in a common agency framework and 
makes up the first two chapters of the dissertation. The second issue to be explored is the 
relationship between cost sharing and membership size in club models and is the subject of 
the third chapter. Each issue will be discussed in turn, roughly following the sequence in 
which they are presented. 
The typical approach in exploring topics of collective action and analyzing their 
results within the context of public goods, usually relies on maintaining the dichotomy 
between the assumptions of noncooperative behavior on one hand, and complete cooperation 
among the relevant parties, on the other. The aim of the first two chapters is to fill the gap by 
exploring the impact of partial cooperation within the context of common agency. In order to 
do so, we first start by amending the multi-principal, multi-task, single-agent model with 
hidden action developed by Dixit. This is the main topic of Chapter I, where effort is devoted 
to &milianze the reader with the main aspects and characteristics of the model and to set the 
stage for analyzing the effects of partial cooperation in the subsequent chapter. 
Thus in Chapter 1 we review the outcome of noncooperative behavior in a standard 
common agency model with multiple principals of given types and multiple tasks. There we 
see and explain the typical result - a weakening of agent incentives with the consequent 
lowering of agent effort when compared to the fiilly cooperative case. The cooperative case 
serves as an important benchmark from which all other resuhs can be measured since it is the 
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best possible outcome, given the problem posed by hidden action. Acknowledging these 
results, one might expect that at least partial cooperation will improve matters, at least in the 
direction of moving from a third-best outcome (the standard common agency result) towards 
a second-best one. 
In the first chapter, we are also introduced to a special common agency model that 
will be extensively used throughout the second chapter. In this version of the model, there are 
two outcomes, each independently related to the agent's actions, but public to certain types of 
principals, and private to others. It is also assumed that each action is technically independent 
of one another so that the agent's cost function is essentially additively separable. These 
restrictions, in addition to simplifying the presentation, have the added advantage of helping 
to avoid biasing the case for, or against partial cooperation as a method of improving 
efficiency within the framework of a common agency. 
In Chapter 2 and within the context of the specific model discussed above, partial 
cooperation means that there is only one type of principal (out of two possible types) likely to 
form a coalition and act in a unified manner, unilaterally with respect to the other type of 
principals, who remain unorganized. In this chapter, there are two important cases of 
concern. The first is a game in which the organized group moves simultaneously with all 
other unorganized principals when designing the agent's incentive contract. In this game, 
increased cooperation results in an overall improvement in the agent's effort in both 
dimensions (of tasks), given that the agent's marginal incentives have been strengthened; 
however, the cooperating principals are shown to be worse off than had they not formed. 
Accordingly, there are then no incentives for them to organize. 
In the second major scenario, it is assumed that the smallest group has a strategic 
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first-mover advantage over other non-organizing principals. Results under these assumptions 
show that this strategic advantage not only improves the welfare of this group, but there 
exists sufficient inducement for them to form a coalition. In addition, agent efforts are 
strengthened overall, a direct result of a bolstering of the agent's aggregate marginal 
incentives. The outcome, in fact, is constrained Pareto efficient, better than even third best. 
Far from worsening matters, partial cooperation coupled with a first-mover advantage, leaves 
organizing principals better ofE^ in addition to reinforcing agent incentives. 
Chapter 2 also includes sections investigating potential ways to alter the rather 
pessimistic outcomes in Section 2.1. In Section 2.1.1 for example, we examine the impact of 
payment restrictions The placement of certain payment restrictions is an attempt to limit the 
indirect transfer of wealth between the two types of principals via the agent. To a certain 
extent, these restnctions can aid partial cooperation in improving efficiency; thus, it is 
possible to overturn the previous result of the failure of partial cooperation to improve 
efficiency in the simultaneous move game. In another section. Section 2.2, we explore two 
different ways in which a central authority can implement a policy. Though both are a bit 
more heavy handed when compared to a policy of only imposing restrictions, they try to 
retain as much of a decentralized orientation as possible. The first policy involves subsidizing 
the principals' margined payments to the agent. The second, uses a more direct approach, 
subsidizing the agent directly. Chapter 2 closes with a discussion concerning the relative 
merits of intervention. 
Issues of collective action and the interdependence of individuals also arise within the 
environment of congestible public goods. Chapter 3 examines the relationship between cost 
sharing and membership size within the freunework of two club models. The purpose of the 
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chapter is to demonstrate heuristically how impacts on a club's cost structure can lead to 
changes in membership size by either increasing or decreasing the benefits to cost sharing 
(jimong a given number of members). In Section 3 .2, we take a well known result from the 
principal-agent literature - that implementing a given level of effort can be relatively more 
costly when effort is not observable than when it is - and apply it to a simple club model. It 
is then shown that this increased cost, the cost of agency, does indeed result in an increased 
desire for additional members. In the next section, we utilize a slightly more informal 
modeling approach in order to describe how an outside source of revenue may influence the 
size of a club's membership base by reducing its need to engage in cost sharing. Results 
demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, as a consequence of the additional source of revenue 
applied to covering club costs, membership size can decrease. 
In more complicated models, these results may not always hold as they do in the 
models examined in Chapter 3, but the logic of the connection is at least suggestive. The 
same caveat holds for the models mainly analyzed in Chapter 2. But nevertheless, the results 
there indicate an interesting way of approaching problems of collective action, which is 
through the lens of partial cooperation. Finally, in the conclusion, we quickly summarize the 
most salient points of the previous three chapters. 
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CHAPTER 1: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMON AGENCY, 
PARTI 
1.1 Introduction 
There are many instances in which actions of individuals have public effects. These 
effects or externalities exist in circumstances where relationships between the parties that 
generate these effects and those that are affected by them are formalized either by economic, 
political, or legal means, or by familial ties. Thus, when asking how these externalities can be 
internalized or at least ameliorated, it is also important to consider simultaneously to what 
extent the various participants involved can influence the agent generating the externalities. 
Institutional design may also play a role, through the goal of trying to improve economic 
efficiency either by a proper setting of rules and guidelines (which must either be enforceable 
or within the parties' interests to follow) or by fostering cooperation and bargaining among 
the parties involved. 
A related question is whether a superintendent authority should intercede beyond the 
aforementioned setting of the rules of the game. Not only does the answer to this question 
depend on the potential of there being possible and proper venues and channels for 
cooperation among the parties in question, of whether or not there exists the possibility of 
collective action and/or contracting, but also on the perceived effectiveness of the proposed 
policy, its ease of implementation, and its information requirements. This view essentially 
creates a slightly alternate view towards the standard externality problem that, to a certain 
extent, goes beyond simple decentralized contracting or Coase bargaining. Even though ail 
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parties have a means to exert pressure and influence the agent through either of these 
methods, there might still be room for the central authority to play a non-passive role in 
obtaining a better outcome. By allowing the possibility of all having a potential active role to 
play, we can than assess or at least obtain a better feeling for the likelihood of bringing about 
the desired changes. 
With these features in mind, the problem of common agency represents an 
appropriate vehicle to explore the impact of conflicting groups of stakeholders or principals 
on an agent's incentives and the various responses of the principals to the situation they find 
themselves in. We can also investigate the possibility of intervention by an authority to 
improve efficiency when the need arises. Although an agent may operate at times under a 
harsh glare of public or private scrutiny, differences in information between the principals 
and their agent can fail to disappear or improve. For example, it can be difficult for a 
stakeholder or a representative of an interest group to be sure whether a public official 
devotes more time to her concerns or not, let alone to another's. The source of the 
asymmetric information between principals and the common agent in this case, is one of 
hidden action. And the important aspect of this problem, and what generally causes 
deviations from second-best outcomes, is the overall impact of multi-principal competition in 
simultaneously influencing agent actions and its effect on agent incentives. 
The overall goal in using this approach is to provide a better understanding of the 
difficulties facing various parties concerned and the challenges of collective action, 
especially when confronting the issue of positive externalities and the appropriate levels of 
provision in more realistic and decentralized settings. These matters are not irrelevant and are 
especially pertinent in situations involving multilateral organizations such as the United 
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Nations or regional and local governments or agencies within multiple jurisdictions and/or 
with heterogeneous constituents, especially when these type of organizations operate in 
seemingly opaque environments. Countries acting as principals for example, may have 
differing goals; some may favor peacekeeping over development. In such circumstances, the 
attempts of principals to engage and influence the actions of the agent independently can 
render the cigent's incentives ineffective, resulting in inefficient outcomes as compared to the 
outcome that might occur if all had agreed and were prepared to cooperate fully. 
Generally this inefficiency is a result of free riding among principals, but, in a special 
case to be explored, this may also be due to the fact that common agency can become a 
conduit within which wealth, albeit indirectly, is transferred between principals. If this is the 
case, say in multilateral organizations, it is then possible that partial cooperation by a group 
most likely to solve the free rider problem can, at times, be self-defeating to those groups or 
if beneficial, then possibly self-defeating from an overall organizational perspective. These 
reasons may partially explain those events in which gains in efficiency are at times 
outweighed by one-sided concerns of distribution, when the overall goal of an organization is 
subverted to serve the parochial interests of one group of members. If the mechanism 
allowing the transfer of wealth is prohibited, these effects need not occur, and partial 
cooperation then can move the agency towards improved outcomes. This case may mirror 
those times when one group of countries or jurisdictions act in concert and whose actions are 
broadly consistent with the overall goals of the organization. However, in some special 
circumstances, partial cooperation has the ability to be both beneficial to the organizing 
group and efficiency enhancing. Thus, it is possible that a group's narrow pursuit of their 
own interest may not only serve to improve upon certain outcomes, but may also leave other 
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parties at least no worse off than they were before - a "sort of weakened version of a "win-
win" situation. 
Although it is not claimed that observable efficiencies or inefficiencies in such 
organizations or relationships can be solely attributed to success or failure to interdict 
indirect income transfers among the principals via the agent, it is at least conceivable this 
issue can exacerbate an already precarious situation. Analogous situations seem to resonate 
in everyday life. For example, a constituency may withhold support or require compensation 
(if not similar treatment) from the common agent for actions that benefit others but not itself 
The model to be explored is therefore suggestive. But before delving into the full model and 
matters more fully, it is perhaps advisable at the outset to review some of the main results 
already existing in the common agency literature. 
1.2 General Review of the Common Agency Model 
The source of asymmetric information between principals and the common agent can 
be either a result of hidden information or hidden action. The effect of hidden action is 
relatively straightforward and although the model to be developed later also concerns the 
problem of moral hazard, it is perhaps important to review some of the established results. 
Usually the presence of hidden action - the inability of principals or stakeholders to monitor 
the agent's action or to enforce a contract based on the Jigent's actions - causes a weakening 
of incentives when compared to that of the second-best outcome, that being what is reached 
under hidden action when the principals are able to cooperate and to contract with the agent 
on a unified one-to-one basis (see Bemheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit (1996, 1997)). 
With a risk-averse agent only caring about the aggregate payment received and the principals 
all taking the other principals' payments to the agent as given, this result, is due to each 
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principal's incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. That is, each principal is 
cognizant of the opportunity to derive benefits from the contributions of others while also 
being acutely aware of the increased costs that one must bear in the form of an additional 
contribution. Consequently, each principal contributes too little an amount, thus leading to 
the diminished power of the contract (in terms of the strength of incentives needed to 
influence the agent's actions). 
The problem of common agency with hidden information concerning an agent's 
characteristics has been investigated by Martimort (1990) and Stole (1990). The results of 
this problem are slightly more involved than with hidden action. Under similar assumptions 
as above (except for a risk-neutral agent and the inability of each principal to contract on 
other variables of direct interest to others, other than its own) hidden information results in 
outcomes that may fall on either side of the second-best outcome. Whether the result is more 
or less efficient than the benchmark second-best case depends on whether the contracting 
variables, the agent's efforts or actions, are substitutes or complements lor one another. 
In a typical single-principal single-agent problem, the result is a downward distortion 
in the agent's incentives for the least efficient type of all agents that the principal may 
contract with. This result also follows through for the multiple-principal single-agent 
problem if the agent's associated tasks for each principal are contract complements. However 
in this case, the result is less efficient than second-best outcomes. This follows because the 
addition of another principal makes it increasingly attractive for the other to distort the 
agent's effort fiirther downward in response to the other doing the same. If^ on the other 
hand, the contracting variables are substitutes, the desire for each principal to reduce agent 
effort (again with the aim to reduce rent extraction), in the domain of its concern, is tempered 
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by the consequence that this would have on the agent's incentives. Doing so only makes it 
more attractive for the agent to substitute away and increase effort in the dimension and 
direction favorable to the other principal. The overall effect then is a smaller distortion of 
incentives than even in the second-best case. 
A question arises as to what the principals, or even a central authority, can do to 
improve efficiency, at least in the cases where the probable outcome is worse than second-
best efficient Under the typical assumptions of common agency, where increased agent 
actions are seen to be socijilly desirable, the solution requires a strengthening of agent 
incentives. This can be accomplished in several different ways (for example, see Bemheim 
and Whinston (1 ^ 86)), but perhaps the easiest to intuit is to allow some degree of cooperation 
among the principals In reality this is easier said than done, and yet in some common agency 
models, the possible added complications are ignored. Increased efficiency can sometimes 
come at another's expense and therefore it may not pay for some parties to cooperate unless 
given sufficient additional compensation. This issue and others are mostly addressed later, in 
Chapter 2, but in order to get there, we first need to introduce and discuss the hidden action 
multi-principal, multi-task, single-agent model developed by Dixit (1996). Due to the 
specific nature of the model, the following analysis and some initial results are somewhat 
familiar although there can be certain important differences when the agent's actions are not 
completely excludable and when many principals exist within the varying types of the 
principal population. These differences matter in the presence of collective goods, especially 
as more stakeholders or constituents find themselves within the range of being affected by 
and within the sphere of influencing the actions of the agent, while at the same time, also 
trying to improve on the outcome of the common agency problem. 
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More specifically. Dixit has demonstrated that it is possible to move fi-om a third-best 
outcome to a second-best one by restricting principal payments in the dimensions that are not 
of direct concern to the principals. This was done for the special symmetric case, in which for 
every task, there is only one principal directly impacted through the single dimension of the 
agent's effort in a given task. But if there exist more than one principal for every type, the 
effect of this restriction, made supposedly by mutual agreement, can be to partition the effect 
of the common agency problem to be limited to remaining within the various groupings as 
distinguished by type. Efficiency improves since the agent's incentives are strengthened in 
each dimension, but the result still falls short of securing a second-best outcome since there 
still exists incentives, for each principal, within every type, to fi"ee ride on the payments of 
others who are of the same type. If a group is able to overcome this problem, which requires 
not only cash transfers among principals of different types, but also transfers among 
principals of the same kind, second-best efficiency can be obtained by groups for the domain 
of their concern. Essentially this result plus an extended discussion of the more general 
results obtained fi'om the general model are the subjects of the present chapter. The 
subsequent chapter, as mentioned above, concerns issues of collective action within the 
context of the conmion agency problem and is one of the main contributions of the paper. 
The central issue to be addressed there, is whether there is sufficient motivation for a given 
type of principal to organize and collectively provide an incentive contract for the agent. 
1.3 Model and Initial Results 
For simplicity, the agent's tasks or actions are limited to two dimensions. There are 
also only two types of principals but n'' (k = A, B) of each type so that overall there are n'^ + 
n® = n principals. Note that when there is only one principal of each type, this will be 
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consistent to Dixit's symmetric m = n case, where the number of tasks (m) equals the number 
of principals. Matrix notation is not used. This slightly complicates the initial presentation 
but will make things easier and a bit clearer later on when we investigate potential ways of 
improving efficiency. Principals are assumed to be risk neutral with preferences specified as 
j=i 
(k = A, B and i = 1,..n'') where the subscript refers directly to the output resulting from an 
agent's aaion and superscripts index a particular member (i) belonging to a certain type (k) 
of principals. Hereafter then, when referring to a single principal belonging to a given type, 
we will refer to that individual as "Id". The additively separable utility function for each 
principal consists of two elements: a summation of benefits resulting from agent actions 
where each component, ^>^gj, is a product of each principal's constant marginal valuation 
for the output associated with each action of the agent, , and the output itself gj, plus the 
numeraire good, y*". 
The agent imperfectly controls the observable output upon which the principals can 
contract on through the technological relationship; gj = aj + sj where aj represents the agent's 
effort or the level of action for task j, and sj is the observational noise inherent in the 
relationship, sj is normally distributed with mean zero, variance Ojj (j = 1, 2), and covariance 
ai2. It is assumed that the risk averse agent has the following CARA utility function, u(W) = 
- exp(- rW) with r as the agent's coefficient of risk aversion and the agent's net wealth, W, 
specified as the difference between the aggregate payment received from the principals, T, 
and the agent's cost function: W = T - C(ai, a2), where C(.) is increasing and strictly convex 
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in both arguments. Note that in this specification, the agent does not obtain any direct benefit 
from her own actions. This represents a reasonable worst case scenario since the agent's and 
the principals' preferences are somewhat directly opposed - principals would like to see 
higher levels of action where the agent desires to exert less. Thus, principals must condition 
payment in some way related to the agent's effort. If we assume that the principals restrict 
themselves to using a linear contraa when designing an incentive scheme for the agent, 
aggregate payments to the agent has the following representation: T = Q + Zj Pj gj, where Q 
represents the aggregate fixed fee portion of the incentive scheme and Pj, the aggregate 
variable price per unit for output j. The agent's net wealth then can be written as W = Q + Ij 
Pj gj - C(ai, a.2). Using the certainty equivalent of wealth form for the agent's utility; u^^^ = 
E[W] + RP where RP = - '/2(U"/U')var(W) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, i.e. 
the risk premium, we can write 
ijCEw = Q 4- -i- P2a2 - ('/4)r[Pi^aii + P2"cy22 2PiP20^i2] — C(ai, a2) 
Therefore the solution to the agent's maximization problem is characterized by the 
first order conditions. 
where Q = 5C(.)/oaj (j = 1, 2). Writing the solutions to these equations as aj = aj(Pi, P2) for 
each j, and then utilizing the implicit function theorem, we derive the following comparative 
statics; 
(1) Pi - Ci(ai, a2) = 0 
(la) P2 - C2(ai, a2) - 0 
(2) 5aj/5Pj = Cii / D > 0 i,j = l, 2 i*j 
(2a) ddij/dPi = - Qj / D i, j = 1, 2 i j 
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with D = C11C22 - C12C21 > 0. Note that if the agent's actions are separable or independent 
(i.e. the cross partial, Cij, is equal to zero), then 5aj/5Pi = 0 (1, j = 1, 2, i j). To simplify the 
upcoming exposition without detracting from the most salient results of the analysis, we 
assume that the signals are uncorrelated, Ou = 0, and that the cost function has the following 
quadratic form, 
C(aj, a2) =('/2)ai^cu + aia2Ci2 + ('/2)a2^C22 
It is also assumed that actions can be either independent or substitutes, C12 ^ 0.' Incorporation 
of the above quadratic form of the agent's cost function then leads to the following 
alterations of equations (2) and (2a), 
(3) 0aj/5Pj = Cii / A > 0 i, j=l, 2i5ij 
( 3 a )  5 a j / 5 P i  =  -  C 1 2  /  A  <  0  i ,  j = l , 2 i ? i j  
with A = CnC22 — Ci2^ > 0. 
To ensure the agent's participation, each principal, taking as given the payments to 
the agent by the other principals, must sufficiently compensate the agent so that her utility is 
at least as high as she could obtain elsewhere. Thus the individual rationality or participation 
constraint is 
(4) Q + Piai + Pza.! — ('/4)r[Pi^CTii + P2^cy22] - C(ai, a2) > 0 
where the agent's other outside options are exogenous and normalized to be zero. Also note 
that Q = Q'^ •*'2ien® similarly for each Pj (j = 1, 2). 
Since each a j ( j =  1, 2) is not observable or verifiable by the principals, each must 
ensure that the agent's choice of action, when confronted by his or her payment scheme 
(T'° = Q*" +P,'°g, -•-P2^g2 or ET"" = Q*" +P,'"a, +P^a,, where E is the expectation operator 
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over the random variables ei and sj), is consistent with the agent's own best interests while 
taking the other payments offered by the principals, as given. That is, each principal must 
take into consideration the agent's best responses (^(Pi, P2), j = 1, 2) when determining the 
agent's payments. Accordingly we can then sunmiarize the principals' behavior as each 
principal acting as a Stackelberg leader towards the agent and behaving in a Coumot-Nash 
fashion vis-a-vis the other principals. 
The problem for each principal, ki (k = A, B and i = 1,..n'^), then can be written as 
«» 
Maximize EU'° "'"y'" 
r=i 
subject to Q + Piai + P2a2 - ('/2)r[Pi^CTi 1 + Pi'Ojz] - C(ai, a.2) ^ 0 
aj = ^(Pi, P2), j = 1, 2 
plus the principal's budget constraint, Q"" + P,'"a, + P2^a, + y"" = l"", where I*" is exogenous 
income and assumed to be large enough so that the private good is always strictly positive. 
Observe that the first constraint is the agent's participation constraint and the second, the 
agent's incentive compatibility constraint. Solving the budget constraint for and plugging 
the result into the objective function, we can see that the agent's participation constraint 
should be binding at the optimum, otherwise the principal can increase utility by either 
increasing or reducing Q*" without affecting the incentive compatibility constraint. After 
solving for Q*" using the participation constraint, and plugging the result into the objective 
function, we obtain the following expression, 
EU"" =<Dfa, +P,^'''^a, ^P^'^^a, +P3'^-^a, 
- ('/2)r[Pi^Oii + P2^a22] - C(ai, az) 
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where equals the fixed fees paid by all principals of the other type and represents 
the fixed fees paid by all principals of the same type as principal i, but excluding principal i's 
contribution. A similar interpretation holds for the variable payments made to the agent by all 
principals other than principal ki. The problem then is to 
MaximizeEU"^ +<D^a, +1"" +Pr''^a, +P,'^-'^a, 
- (y2)r[Pi^aii + P2^a22] - C(ai, az) 
subject to a, = a,(Pi, P2), j = 1, 2 . 
After incorporation of the incentive compatibility constraints (or the agent's response 
functions), we can then proceed with the optimization problem by taking derivatives with 
respect to Pf (j = 2). Using the agent's first-order conditions, equations (3) and (3a) and 
after some slight manipulations, we obtain the following first-order conditions^ 
(5) P,"": Ofc^ -P.-^c^ +P,^c,, -ra„AP, =0 
(5a) P,^; - Of c„ + <D^c„ + P,'"Cp_ - Pfc,, - ra„ AP, = 0. 
Then summing these equations over all members of type A (i = 1,..n'^) gives 
(6) P,"^; c,2 - P,'^c^ + P^^c,, - n'^ra,,AP, = 0 
(6a) P,^; -<I>f'c,2 +O2C,, +Pi'^c,, -P^'^c,, -n'^ro^AP, =0 
where P,'^ = > and • And similarly for type 
B(i=l,...,n^): 
(7) P,®: Ofc^ -(Dfcp. -P^c^, +P®c,, -n^a„AP, =0 
(7a) Pf; +<J>2C„ +P®c,, -P^^c,, -n^ra^^AP, =0 
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with P,® = ^P,®', P,® = ^Pf', <I>f = , and O® = . Finally summing 
equations (6) and (7) together and (6a) together with (7a), results in 
(8) P,; 0,Cj,-PjCj,+P,c,,-nra„AP, = 0 
(8a) P.; -^iC,2 +P,c,, -P;C,, -nro^AP, = 0. 
And also for completeness, P, = P,'^ + Pf, P, = P,"^ + P® , <I>, = Of + O®, and 
< D ,  = 0 ^ - 0 !  
At this point, we now can solve for the agent's aggregate variable fees, paid by the 
principals, using equations (8) and (8a), 
(9) Pi = [Oi(l + nrCT22C22) -<I>2nra22Ci2](l/^ 
(9a) P: = [<I>2(1 +nrCTiiCu)-<DinraiLCi2](I/D 
where T s l - nrianCn ^ a22C22 + nrCTiia22A). In order for the agent's first-order conditions 
to hold, both (9) and (9a) must be positive. Sufficient conditions for these are [<I'iC22 - O2C12] 
> - (<t)i/nra22) and [O2C11 - 4)iCi2] > - (<I>2/nraii). Note that in the presence of economies of 
scope, C12 < 0, these conditions are easily satisfied and in addition, serve to strengthen the 
agent's aggregate variable fees. Using the expressions for Pi and P2, one can now go back 
and solve for most of the remaining variables and functions of interest (P,'^, P,"^, ai, etc.. .). 
The exceptions being Q'^, Q®, and each Q*", since all are indeterminate. 
To interpret these results, it is instructive to compare these to the first-best case under 
perfect observability or when the agent is risk neutral. For the latter case, r = 0 => P,^ =0, 
and P^ = <t),, the superscript "fb" signifying first best. This result holds with or without 
principal cooperation. In this case, each aggregate marginal payment to the agent is exactly 
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equal to the principals' aggregate valuation of the benefit or output resulting from the 
relevant action taken by the agent. Comparing these expressions to equations (9) and (9a) we 
see that each aggregate payment to the agent is set equal to a weighted sum of not only the 
aggregate valuation of the benefit itself, but also to the difference between the same 
aggregate valuation and that of the other, each weighted by terms associated with agent risk 
aversion and cost parameters and the total number of principals. This is then divided by the 
term It is possible to show that P,"* > P, and Pf > P,, that is, the aggregate marginal 
contributions to the agent are greater under conditions that produce first-best outcomes. In 
addition, it can also be shown that a^ > a^ (j ~ U 2) or that the agent exerts less than first-
best effort under conditions of common agency with asymmetric information.' 
One aspea behind the resulting inefficiency of the common agency when compared 
to the first-best case (for now we will ignore the other, the problem of free riding, until we 
compare equations (9) and (9a) to outcomes that are second best) is that in the latter situation 
when the agent is risk neutral, there is no need to trade off economic efficiency with risk 
sharing. Principals have no reason to distort or weaken marginal incentives in order to 
appease the agent. This allows the aggregate surplus between the parties to be as large as 
possible since it is within both their interests. Presumably part of this surplus is rebated back 
to the principals with negative fixed fees. Alternatively, when there is perfect observability, 
the principals are able to contract directly on effort, and therefore completely able to sidestep 
the problem of conditioning contracts under uncertainty (or rather, asymmetric information). 
Next we compare (9) and (9a) to those expressions derived under conditions of 
second best. Usually referred to as the united principals case, principals, with the aid of 
implied inter-principal cash transfers, agree to maximize the sum of their expected utility 
with respect to Pi, P2, and Q, subject to the agent's participation and incentive compatibility 
constraints and the principals' resource constraint. The only difference between the 
noncooperative and cooperative solutions derived from the marginal conditions is that for the 
latter, the expressions for P,'*' and P^ all show a conspicuous lack of "n-terms". These 
expressions are shown in (10) and (10a): 
and = 1 + r(auCii + 022022 + raiiaiaA). Thus the only difference, to paraphrase Dixit 
(1997), is that in the former case where the principals act separately, the risk-aversion 
parameters are all magnified by a factor n. And as can be seen, this not only results in a 
weakening of the marginal payments to the agent (P,*^ > Pj and Pf > P,) but also a 
weakening in the agent's efforts (af > a, and a? > a,). 
In order to understand the resulting inefficiency in the common agency problem and 
the role of free riding, we rewrite equations (5) and (5a) as 
(11) P,*": -P,'°](aa,/oP,) + [<D^-P,''](aa,/P,)-cEa>/5P, =0 
(1 la) P,^; - P,"" ](aa, /SP,) + [a>f - P,"" ](ca, /5P,) - cRP/cP. = 0 
where RP = - (Vi)r[Pi^aii + P2^cy22]- From these conditions, it is then easy to see that each 
principal considers the impact of their marginal choices on the agent's actions and risk 
premium. Nevertheless he fails to take into account the flow of net benefits to the other 
principals resuhing from changes in the agent's actions. Since these effects are in the form 
of positive externalities to the remaining principals, each principal provides the agent with 
(10) P,**" - [<I>l(l + ra22C22) -<t>2rCT22Cl2](l/^J'^ 
(10a) P^ - [<I>2(1 + rCTiiCii)-<I>iranCi2Kl/*^'^ 
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incentives that are too weak. To see this another way but what amounts to the same thing, 
each principal treats the marginal effect on the agent's risk premium resulting from iiis 
increased payment to the agent as a private cost whereas in effect it is a cost faced by all 
principals. So in weighing his marginal benefits to his marginal costs, he gives too much 
weight, from the standpoint of efficiency, to the costs he feces. Either way one looks at it, 
principals have incentives to free ride. 
As an aside, note in equations (11) and (1 la), the presence of the respective terms; 
[Oj - ](5a2 /^,) and - P,*" ](0ai / ). Each of these terms enters negatively into 
their respective equations and represents an effect that each principal treats as an added cost 
(or as a negative marginal benefit): the agent's substitution of effort away from the other 
activity as payment is increased to reward effort in the direction of the observed outcome of 
concern."* 
To reduce the source of conflict and the potential for free riding, assume the 
following; that ci2 = 0, and that type A principals only directly care about the output or signal 
generated from or related to ai (Of* > 0,= 0) and that only type B principals are directly 
concerned with output generated from aj ((<I>f' = 0,<I)f > 0). These restrictions result in the 
following first-order conditions^ for members of types A and B, 
(12) P,^; <Df*-P,'^-ra„c..P,=0 
(12a) P^; - P^ - ro^c^^P, = 0 
(12b) P,®'; -P«'-ra„c„P. =0 
(12c) Pf; <Df - Pf - ra^Cj^P, = 0. 
Note that although aggregate variable payments to the agent must be positive, individual 
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payments in certain dimensions can be zero or negative. The intuition for this outcome is that 
even, if say, a principal of type A is not directly affected by the agent's choice of action, a2, 
an incentive still exists for the principal to influence the agent's actions. By setting < 0, 
the principal penalizes the agent for higher realized outcomes for output that are not directly 
of concern to him. This in turn requires higher payments from type B principals to offset 
these negative incentives and so, in effect, these fines paid to type A principals by the agent 
are financed by type B principals. Since the same holds true for P,®', the impact is a lowering 
of incentives overall (Dixit 1996, p. 169). These effects, all taken together, will also play an 
important role in the subsequent chapter when we look at the possibility of collective action. 
In addition, note that in the case where > 0, = 0, Of' = 0, (!>?' > 0. but cn > 0, not 
only does the negative marginal payment, < 0, discourage the agent from exerting effort 
in the direction of task two, but because of the substitution effect, ^^2/^Pu the agent is also 
encouraged to expend more effort in the dimension of task one, all things being equal. ^  
For completeness and future reference, summing each of the above equations, (12)-
(12c), over all principals of a particular type, and then by types for each k (k = A, B), results 
in 
(13) P, =- ! 
l + nrCT,,c,, 
(13a) P, = ^ . 
l + nra^c^ 
Using these expressions and the above four first-order conditions, we can derive the group 
levels of the marginal payments to the agent after summing over all i members for each type 
of principal; 
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(14) pA ^ <D;'(l + n"ra„c„) 
1 "t" htct J J J 
(14a) Pr = -
1 + nra^^c^ 
, A _ f l  
(14b) P®=-" B n rCTj,c,] 
1 "T" nr^ i I C| J 
(14c) pB ^0;(l + n^rc^c^) 
1 + nra^c-^ 
And from the agent's first-order conditions. 
(15) a, =(l/c„)P, =(I/c„) 
I + nrCT,,c,, 
ct>! (15a) a, =(l/c^)P, =(l/c^)-
1 + nrcT^c^ 
From the expressions listed in (13)-(13a) and (14)-(14c), it is possible to see the effect of 
principals of one type punishing the agent for realizations of outcomes that are not of direct 
concern to them. These effects force the other principals as a group to pay higher variable 
fees than the final (aggregate) variable for a given dimension so as to offset the negative 
impacts of punishment by the principals of the other type. For example, P,'*^ > P, in order to 
offset the effects of P,® 
Given the simplifying assumptions and the agent's participation constraint at the 
optimum, we can try to gauge the impact of common agency on the agent's fixed fee. 
Solving the participation constraint for Q gives 
Q = - Piai - P2a2 + ('/2)r[Pi^aii + P2^a22] + C(ai, aj). 
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Incorporating the incentive compatibility constraints and differentiating (without loss of 
generality) by Pi, results in 
dQ/dPi = - ai - Pi(5ai/6Pi) + rcuPi + Ci(5ai/oPi). 
Using the agent's first-order conditions and the expression for ai, the above expression can 
be rewritten as 
dQ/dPi = Pi[rCTii - (1/cii)] 
or 
sign(5Q/5Pi) = sign[rcjii - (l/cn)]. 
So the response of Q to changes in Pi can be positively related, independent of or negatively 
related depending on whether rou is greater than, equal to, or less than l/cu. For the rest of 
this paper it will be assumed that 8Q/dPi > 0, meaning that a unit change in Pi has a greater 
impact on the agent's risk premium than it does on the agent's response in effort, i.e. 
5^RP/5Pi^ = ran > 1/cu = oni /5Pi. Thus, as variable payments decrease as a result of the 
common agency problem, the fixed portion of the agent's fees declines as well. 
Finally by listing solutions derived under the assumption of cooperation, it is easy to 
see the suboptimality of the above outcome relative to the second-best case; 
(16) P,^ = ! 
l + ra„c„ 
(16a) Pf=- ^ 
(17) A* =(1/Ch)P,"' =(1/C„), 
l + ro,,c,, 
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(17a) a? =(l/c^)P,'' =(I/c^) . 
l + rCTjjC^ 
That is, the effects of multi-principal competition and free riding remain and so therefore 
overall, P,''' > P,, af > a,, and so on. 
Under conditions of second best, it is assumed that the appropriate cash transfers 
among principals take place so as to internalize the externalities resulting from the 
combination of free riding and acting separately when determining the agent's incentives. 
However, even if one assumed the presence of at least, partial collective action in an attempt 
to strengthen agent incentives, results will show, starting in the next section and chapter two, 
that even this result may be unlikely unless one assumes cash transfers taking place not only 
among the collectivized principals, but also between this group and the unorganized 
principals. If such an event is considered unlikely, then other means of improving efficiency 
must be sought. 
1.4 Further Discussion 
Under standard common agency assumptions, principal cooperation or any form of 
side contracting between them is assumed not to take place either due to problems of 
coordination or because such behavior or arrangements are frowned upon by the authorities, 
possibly because of anti-trust concerns. These initial assumptions serve as a useful starting 
point and can be justified in settings where principals are numerous if not varying widely in 
tastes and income or in market settings consisting of small firms selling similar or slightly 
differentiated products and the conmion agent, a marketing agency. This latter case has been 
investigated by Bemheim and Whinston (1985).® In scenarios concerning the production of 
collective goods or services, whether by an international multilateral agency or by a national 
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or even a local governmental agency, the same assumption concerning the principals' 
inability to cooperate can also be pertinent. For example, individual citizens of a nation may 
feel that, whether organized or not, their actions would have little impact in influencing the 
decisions of a federal agency. Or if such actions could, the derived benefits may still not be 
large enough to outweigh or justify any costs incurred in influencing the behavior of the 
agency. 
As mentioned previously, actions by an agent or more likely, a public official or 
agency has the potential of having its effects felt across many individuals and organizations, 
of varying and similar interests. But since individuals of similar interests might find 
themselves under like circumstances and given that such homogeneity can sometimes ease 
the way for cooperation, our attention should not be restricted in scope so as to preclude the 
possibility for cooperation or only reserve it for the times when it is needed as a benchmark 
from which to measure other results by. Furthermore, by allowing many principals to be of a 
given type permits us to vary the scale of which cooperation may make itself evident. This 
also provides us the opportimity to explore interesting issues in more realistic settings. For 
example, using the restrirted model from above, we can investigate the effects of inter- and 
intra-type principal cooperation when an agent's actions provide localized public services or 
goods without spillovers. The same model can also serve as a simplified but stark depiction 
of a multilateral agency operating under asymmetric information when the agent's actions 
only benefit certain segments of the membership. 
Within the context of our restricted model, when there are no spillovers across 
principal type, i.e., when an agent's output is not of direct concern to certain types of 
principals, it was shown that there still remained incentives for principals to influence the 
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agent's actions in these dimensions. Specifically we saw that < 0 and P,®' < 0. We also 
saw how this forced principals as a group to pay higher marginal incentives to the agent even 
though the overall effect was diminished in aggregate: P,^ > P, and P5 > P,. Still, if it were 
possible for principals to mutually agree upon restricting their ability to contract on these 
variables in their dealings Avith the agent, as proposed by Dixit (1996, 1997), this is not 
sufficient to replicate the second-best solution. This recommendation works for the case 
when there is only one principal of each type as shown by Dixit, but not when there are more 
than one principal for each kind. That is, efficiency will improve but since there remain 
incentives for principals of a given type to free ride, the outcome still falls short of second 
best. Therefore, the only effect of restricting payments in these directions for certain types of 
principals is to partition the effects of the common agency problem so that they are limited to 
specific groups of principals. It is as if members of each type of principal as a group, but 
acting separately, had their own common agent. 
This can be readily seen using equations (12)-(12c). If by mutual agreement, 
presumably aided by cash transfers among principals - which would occur for example, if a 
reshifling of the burden of the fixed fee to be paid to the agent is not sufficient enough to do 
the job - principals agree to set = P,®' = 0, the first-order conditions reduce to 
(18) P,^: <Df-P,^-ra„c„P,''=0 
(18a) Pf: <t)f-Pf-ro^c^P,® = 0. 
Then as before, summing equation (18) over all i 6 n'^ and (18a) for all i s n®, and solving 
each respectively for and P®-^" results in 
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(19) 
I + n'^rc^c,,  
(19a) = Pf"^' = ^~ 
l + n®ra^c. 
where the "RXJ" of the superscript refers to the characterization of the solution we investigate 
- that principals restrict their payments in certain dimensions but remain unorganized, 
separately making payments to the agent in the dimension of direct concern to them. Using 
these results to derive expressions for the agent's optimal levels of effort gives 
(20) ar''=(l/c„)- P-
1 + n ra,,c,, 
(20a) af = (1/c^)- P 
1 + n ra^c^ 
Equations (19), (19a), (20), and (20a) show that, under this agreement, principals are 
able to increase the agent's level of effort as compared to the original third-best outcome 
under conrmion agency. As can be seen, these solutions still fall short of second best. That is, 
P, < P,'^" < P," and P, < P^^' < Pf so that a, < af^ < af and a, < a^" < a?. Moreover 
under conunon agency, type A principals, as a group pay less in terms of the marginal 
incentive payment to be paid to the agent for gi outcomes, but receive less payment for 
output realizations that are not of direct concern to them. This also holds for type B 
principals so that overall we have 
pA ^ p A.RL- pB > pB.RU 
\^21 > 1 = 0 I > 1 = 0-
In terms of the marginal conditions, this means that aggregate utility for each type of 
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principal is likely to be ambiguous and therefore successfiil bargaining over cash transfers 
among principals, in addition to the determining of the distribution of fixed payments to be 
made to the agent (among principals), is needed to ensure participation for ail concerned. 
It should be noted here that expressions (19) and (19a) can also be viewed as 
Samuelson conditions for two collective goods. Given our present working assumptions, first 
best entails Of = P,"" = C, and O® = P,"" = C,, or in words, that the summation of marginal 
benefits resulting fi-om an additional unit of action taken by the agent be equated to its 
marginal cost. From (19) and (19a) we see, in each case, that only a fi^action of the aggregate 
benefits, say for a particular community of similar types, is equated to marginal cost. This 
results in lower levels of action taking by the agent and hence lower expected output. 
Of related interest, it is worth comparing the above results, say equations (19) and 
(20), with that of the standard voluntary provision of a public good model with quasilinear 
utility (for example, see Comes and Sandler, 1996, Chapter 6). The standard result, with 
Coumot-Nash behavior but without the problem of asymmetric information, is also 
suboptimaJ in relation to the cooperative case. The public good, or in the context of our 
present discussion, the agent's action, is underprovided. However the Coumot-Nash 
equilibrium of that game is independent of the number of contributors, where this is not the 
case for common agency with hidden action as can be seen in the aforementioned equations. 
It also can be shown in the latter case, that as the number of each type of principal increases, 
the agent's levels of effort decline fiirther. In addition, the suboptimal outcome of the 
common agency apparently follows directly from the problem of asymmetric information 
and the noncooperative behavior of the principals. However, once the problem of asymmetric 
information is eliminated between the principals and the agent under common agency, the 
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provision of agent services are no longer suboptimal. The difference in this result over the 
typical voluntary provision of the public good model, despite the fact that noncooperative 
behavior is postulated for both, is each principal's ability to specify a contract and to contraa 
for specific levels of performance by the agent.' There is no similar ability or comparative 
option, explicitly or implicitly, under the standard assumptions of the voluntary provision 
model. 
Finally returning to our discussion concerning ways to improve upon third-best 
outcomes within the context of our present assumptions, it is not too hard to imagine that 
with a bit more cooperation, matters can be fiarther improved upon. Suppose for example, 
that in addition to imposing restrictions on certain types of payments to be made to the agent, 
principals of similar tastes and income are able to overcome the free-rider problem and 
organize into specialized groups representing their own interests. Although this process is in 
itself hard to model, we can speculate that this level of cooperation may have been fostered 
by similarity of tastes and income among principals or a result of their geographical 
proximity to one another (which admittedly could have been the initial cause for similarity of 
the principals). Either way, assume that principals of the same type agree to maximize the 
aggregate sum of benefits flowing in their direction subject to the group's resource constraint 
and the agent's incentive compatibility and participation constraints, while taking the other 
group's contributions as given. This of course presumes that each group is able to develop 
and establish some kind of cost sharing scheme so as to entice principals of the same kind to 
enlist in the joint effort. Nevertheless, all this will be considered as a fait accompli and 
therefore the relevant first-order conditions now become 
(21) <Dr-P,^-ra, .c„P, '^=0 
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(21a) <i>2 - Pf - ro^c^P® = 0. 
It doesn't take much to see that these equations solve to give the second-best solutions for 
P,^ and Pf. 
If the sequence of the proceeding analysis seemed a bit unnatural, it probably should, 
since we started out first by assuming cooperation among all members and types of principals 
in order to self-impose certain restrictions on payments made to the agent. Though this 
improved efficiency in relation to the original third-best outcome, assuming further 
cooperation in the form of principals of the same type forming their own interest group was 
still necessary to achieve the second-best outcome. Although the sequence doesn't alter the 
analytical results - the particular order of the above presentation was chosen to highlight 
some key points - a more logical development would be the reverse. That is, a more natural 
progression would entail similar principals forming into groups first and then once these 
groups are established, inter-group cooperation and bargaining to restrict certain payments 
made to the agent.'' This will roughly be the line we take in the next chapter where we 
explore more explicitly the issue of collective action within the context of common agency. 
1.5 Notes 
' If an agent's actions are in fact complementary, < 0, then there are economies of scope in having the agent 
perform multiple or even possibly, in retaining a common agent As can be seen from the comparative 
statics in (3a), if an agent's actions are compiementaiy, an increase in the marginal reward for an outcome in 
one dimension encourages agent effort in the other. The assumption that actions are either independent or 
substitutes is consistent with assumptions made elsewhere (Dixit (1996) and Hoimstrom and Nfflgrom (1990)). 
To a certain extent, the interest in assuming a positive cross partial probably stems from the desire to evaluate 
the worst possible scenario, where tasks may conflict Although this assumption decreases the desirability of 
common agency, principals still share the common costs of ensuring the agent's participation and to the extent 
their interests are similar, the determination of the agent's variable fees. 
' This can be shown in the following steps for the derivative with respect to . First after taking the 
derivative, one should obtain: 
J, i^L+pM-o .^ ^+p«-> ro„p, 
' ap, sp," ' oP, ap," 5P, cP," ' 5P, sp," ap, ap," * ap, ap," ap," 
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_ 5a,  ^ oa, 
-C, — ^-C, —= J- = o.  
5P, dP,*' • cP, SP," 
Making the appropriate substitutions gives: 
cDj' £=—<1);' £I2-+P<-" ^+P"-' is—pr" £ii—p,"-> ICTP, -R iH.+p. £H.=O . 
' A  - A  ' A  A  -  A  •  A  "  ' A  " A  
Multiplyiiig through by A and grouping like terms gives equation (S) in the text 
 ^ It is easier to see the% and the results stenmiing from comparison of solutions (9) and (9a) to those derived 
under principal collusion (the second-best, sb, case) when using matrix notation. In brief; these are the 
comparisons of P'' = <I> versus P = 0/(1 + nrZC) and P*** = <I>/(I + rZC) versus P = 0/(1 + nrZC) where the P's 
and 0 are (2x1) matrices with the obvious interpretations; I is a (2x2) identity matrix, Z is a (2x2) diagonal 
variance-covariance matrix, and Cis a (2x2) positive definite matrix of cost terms. In addition, the solution to 
the agent's ptx)blems can be characterized by the equation a = C'P. a® = C'P", a**" = C'P .^ For additional 
details, one can see Dixit (1996,1997). 
'* This interpretation assumes that c  ^> 0. If Ci2 < 0, these terms would have an opposite reading. 
 ^The first-order conditions, (12) - (12c), can be found easily by imposing the above restrictions on equations 
(S) and (Sa) for the appropriate type of principal 
 ^ Again an opposite interpretation holds when Cn < 0. 
 ^ Whether the agent's variable fees are positive or negative, we will, for the rest of the chapter and throu)  ^the 
next, sometimes refer to them without distinction, assuming that in most cases, that context will be clear enough 
to Higringiiish between the two. Otherwise payments will refer to positive payments made to the agent, and 
punishments, as negative payments to the agent or payments made by the agent to principals. 
In fzct Bemheim and Whinston demonstrate how common agency can actually tacitly facilitate collusion. 
 ^That is. one can envision each principal choosing a ftmction or schedule. P,*  ^(a,), specifying the amount that 
he is willing to pay for a given level of provision which is also the amount to be provided. Without the problem 
of asymmetric information each principal's problem can be specified as choosing P~ (a,) and a, in order to 
maximize Oi^ a, +1* - P* (a,) subject to P* - C(a,) > 0. After slight manipulation of the first order 
conditions and the agent's participation constraint, one obtains the desired result:  ^C>f = C, . For a more 
formal treatment, see Dixit. Grossman, and Helpman (1997). 
If the standard voluntary contribution model is altered a bit to allow two stages, where in the first, each 
contributor chooses a matching rate and in the second stage, a flat rate, so that overall a contributor's total 
payment "is his flat contribution, plus the product of the vector of his matching rates offered to each of his 
fellows, times the vector of flat contributions (also) chosen by his fellows" (Guttman, 1991, p33), it is not 
surprising that this game of voluntary provision and matching behavior with identical individuals, results in a 
Pareto optimal level of provision given the previous discussion that also includes the prior endnote. (Dne can 
view this matching contribution model as one where implicit or tacit contracting takes place among the 
contributors without the aid of an agent 
'' Albeit that at each stage, efficiency improves no matter which sequence is taken, the analysis ignores the 
possible machinations needed to ensure that voluntary behavior is consistent with improved efficiency. Without 
these, some parties might actually become worse off and therefore would not enter such agreements unless 
some of these were imposed say, by a central authority. Given the agent's constraints and the already specified 
tools needed to align agent incentives and to share the surplus between principals and the agent, the agent will 
always be held to her reservation utili^  level. Therefore going firom one regime to another, wel&re impacts in 
terms of utility will be felt solely by the principals and these will differ among types. These dijQerences will be 
highiightt  ^once we suppose thk types may act synunetrically (see next chapter). Given the complicated nature 
of the problem and some expressions, it isn't always possible to definitively compare a given type's utili^  
between different regimes. However with improved e£5ciency brought about by a change in regime, voluntary 
behavior will be consistent with our story if the appropriate cash transfers take place among principals of the 
same type, between types, or between groups of different types. If it is not possible to arrange trankers and the 
like so that some principals cannot be assured of not being made worse oB, our story of voluntary cooperation 
breaks dowit Some other intervention would then have to take place in order to improve on potential third-best 
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situations. So that the above analyses remain relevant, it must be assumed that voluntary cooperation can at 
times be possible and if so. that these transfers, although not modeled, take place. We might also suppose that 
the structure of these transfers and the bargaining that must take place in order to ensure these reforms are 
successful, will not always be invariant to the order with which cooperation may develop. However we have 
assumed away any problems that may cause this to be so. 
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CHAPTER 2: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMON AGENCY, 
PART 2 
2.1 Partial Organization with Simultaneous Moves 
According to Olson (1965), smaller groups are better able to overcome the problem of free 
riding than larger groups. There can be several reasons for this, but a persuasive argument is 
that with larger groups, individuals will typically view their efforts towards collective 
provision as having little if any significant impact on the outcome. Yet irrespective of one's 
behavior, an individual would still anticipate enjoying the public benefits bestowed upon 
them by the efforts of others. Consequently rational behavior would lead such participants to 
lower their level of effort or contributions. This would be less likely with smaller groups 
where it is more probable that individual incentives will be closely aligned with group 
incentives. 
This same logic would also seem to apply within the context of group formation. That 
is, similar individuals who are less numerous than another segment of the population might 
find it easier to organize and form an interest group so as to provide stronger incentives to an 
agent providing them with a localized public good.' Similar reasoning would also apply to 
like-minded principals within a multilateral organization. Using the model developed so far 
and the previous results, we can examine this proposition. As will be seen in this section, 
despite an organized group's ability to strengthen the marginal incentives and the agent's 
action of direct concern to them, they are worse off as a group than if they were acting 
separately. Moreover, the remaining unorganized group may be better off than they would 
under standard agency assumptions, that is when all types of principals act separately. Given 
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that the organized group is worse off^ we can conclude that there would then be no incentives 
for these principals to organize unilaterally with respect to the others who remain 
unorganized. In short, we can expect that under the typical common agency scenario, like 
that of the standard prisoner's dilemma game, there is no incentive for individuals to 
unilaterally alter their strategies and cooperate. 
We start by first assuming that n® > n'^ > 2 and that all principals of type A organize 
and agree to maximize the sum of their aggregate benefits subject to their total resource 
constraint and the agent's incentive compatibility and participation constraint. Group A also 
treats the payments made to the agent by unorganized principals as given. So despite the 
ability of type A principals to organize, the principals still move simultaneously and act as 
Stackelberg leaders in relation to the agent. Remaining within the confines of our restriaed 
common agency model, we can then represent Group A's problem as choosing Q'^, , and 
in order to 
Maximize EU'*^ =^^^1 
subject to Q + Piai + Pjaj - (14) rfPi^cJii + Pj^CTja] - C(ai, az) ^ 0 
aj = aj(Pj) j = 1,2 
plus the group's resource constraint, + P,'^a, +P^a, + y'^ = . On the other hand, the 
representative maximization problem for a typeB individual is to chose Q®', P®', and Pf' to 
Maximize EU®' = a, + y®' 
subject to Q + Piai + P2^2~ 0^) r[Pi^(Ju P2^022] — C(at, aj) ^ 0 
aj = ^(Pj) j ~ 1,2 
and the individual's budget constraint, Q®' + P®'a, + Pj^'a, + y®' = I®'. From these two 
35 
problems we obtain the following and respective first-order conditions, 
(22) =0 
(22a) P,-": - P,'' - rci^c^P, = 0 
(22b) P,®' : -P,®'-ro„c„P, =0 
(22c) Pf; <Df - Pf - ra^c^P, = 0. 
Summing over all type B principals in equations (22b) and (22c) results in 
(23) -P®-n®ntj„c„P, =0 
(23a) Of -P,® -n®ro^c^P, = 0, 
Then summing over P,"^ and Pf and over Pf and Pf (using expressions (22) and (23) and 
also (22a) and (23a) respectively) results in the following aggregate variable payments to be 
made to the agent for a given realization of output under conditions of partial organization, 
PO, by the principals; 
(24) P~ = ' 
(24a) ?r = 
l + (n +I)rtr,,c„ 
I + (n +I)ra3,c^ 
It is not hard to see when comparing these expressions to the standard third-best 
outcomes under common agency that P,~ > P, and Pf° > P,. Inasmuch the agent's optimal 
level of effort is monotonic in Pi and P2: af° > a, and a^ > a,. This is a direct result of 
there being less fi-ee-riding or what really amounts to the same thing, less competition in 
influencing the agent's actions. The reason is that partial organization by the principals 
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lowers the effective cost facing the principals in terms of the agent's risk and cost parameters 
- there are now (n'^ - I) less principals treating the agency costs as a private cost. Meaning 
that the n (n = n'^ + n®) multiplying these parameters under standard common agency is 
reduced to (1 + n®) multiplying the same parameters under this partially organized case of 
common agency, the "I" being interpreted as representing all type A principals acting as a 
single unit. 
If the variable payments of equations (24) and (24a) are broken down into payments 
made (and received by principals as a group (whether organized or not)), the results for the 
partially organized case are 
(25) P, A.PO _ (1 + n ra,iC,i) 
l + (n® +l)ra„c,, 
(25a) Pr-^ = -Ajo _ 22^22) 
l + (n +l)rcT2:C: 
vA B 
(25b) P,"" B.PO _ ^1 ^^11^11) 
l+(n®+l)rCT„c„ 
(25c) Pf-^ = , ^3 Bj>0 ^2 'O 22^22 ) 
l + (n® +l)ra-22C2 
Comparing these expressions to those obtained under our typical "completely 
unorganized" common agency case, equations (14)-(14c), we obtain the following results, 
pA ^ pA^ pB ^ p B.PO 
pA|^|pA.PO| |pB|^|pB^| 
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Or in words, type A principals as a group pay higher marginal fees to the agent for gi 
outcomes and receive lower marginal payments from the agent for g2 outcomes than under 
standard common agency. The unorganized principals, type B, as a whole, however, receive 
higher marginal payments for gi outcomes and pay lower marginal fees for g2 outcomes. 
Although aggregate variable fees are higher in the partially organized case and induce higher 
levels of effort on the part of the agent, of the higher P,^, type B receives some of it by 
setting a higher punishment for outcomes in the dimension that is not of direct concern to 
them. The reverse does not hold true for organized type A principals for outcomes of gz-
Even though is higher, organized type A principals receive less. These results seem to 
infer that the increase in efficiency^ as evidenced by higher aggregate marginal fees and 
higher levels of agent effort comes at the expense of the organized group and may result in 
added benefits for those principals that remain unorganized. This may indeed be the case, as 
we now show. 
Using previous results, aggregate utility, by principal type, under standard common 
agency is 
=  O f  a ,  + -  P . ' ^ a ,  -
U® =cDSa, +1® -P®a, -Pfa, -Q® 
or 
(26) V" ^ I ^ 
(l + nra,,c„)" (l + nrc^^Cj,)" 
(26a) 
(l + nra^c^,)" (l + nrcy,,c„)-
Under the partially organized case, these utilities become 
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(27) 
(27a) 
U A.PO 
(<Df)'ro„ 
(l + (n +l)rCT„c„) (I+(n +l)r<T22C„) 
T + I" -Q A.PO 
u BJO 
(<D®)-n®ro^ (0; ') 'n®ra„ 
(l + (n +l)ra„C22)" (l + (n +l)ra,,c,,) T + I -Q 
B.PO 
From these expressions, we prove the first of our major results. 
Proposition 1: Given equal cost sharing of the agent's fixed fee among all principals, type 
A principals are collectively and individually worse off for having organized than not 
Unorganized type B principals on the other hand, are better off, the same as, or worse off 
when others organize. 
Argument: 
Type A principals - to state our case, it is sufficient to argue that 
yA _uA.ro n 1 
(l + nra„c„)- (l + (n +l)ra„c„)-
+ (<!>:) ra^ n 
(l + nra^c^,)* (I+ (n® + OrcTj^c^)* _ 
-(Q -Q' '™)>0. 
It is possible to show that the bracket terms are strirtly positive as long as (n®)^ > n'^ and 
, • B 
n > 1. These are weaker conditions and therefore easily satisfy our prior assumption that n 
> n'^ > 2. Consequently our result hinges on the term (Q'^ - being either a small 
enough positive number, zero, or negative. Given that both Q"^ and are indeterminate, 
we can only surmise that in general these fixed payments are not set arbitrarily but by some 
kind of negotiating or bargaining process. If it is assumed that the outcome of this process is 
equal cost sharing^, then each principal's share of the aggregate fixed payment to the agent is 
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either Q/nor Q /n. Thus in order to sign the term (Q-Q ),we need to sign 
(n'^ /n)[Q -Q^ ]. Using the agent's participation constraint and the appropriate expression 
for each level of the agent's action in the appropriate scenario, we obtain 
(—)[Q-Q'°l = (l/2)(—){(ro„ -—)[(?,)= -{P,"')-]+(ro= -—)[(?=)' -(Pf)'} 
n n Cjj C-VT 
The sign of which - given our results concerning the aggregate variable payments to the 
agent and our prior assumption of a positive relationship between the variable fees and the 
fixed fee (see pages 22-23) - is negative. Accordingly then (Q"*" ) < Oand therefore 
UA ^ . Since A as a group suffers overall a loss of utility if organized, identical 
individual members must also be worse off in the absence of any compensating payments. 
Tvpe B Principals - the argument is similar, we need to ascertain the sign of 
U® -U®-~ =(0!) 'n®ra. 1 1 
(I + nra„c^)- (I + (n®+l)rCT„C22)" 
+ ((Dr) 'n°ra, .  1 1 
_(l + nra„c„)- (l + (n®+l)ra„c„)-_ 
-(Q® 
Visual inspection of the bracketed terms show that both are negative in sign, therefore we 
need to determine the sign of (Q® - ). Given equal cost sharing and that under partial 
organization, Q < , we obtain (Q® - ) < 0. Whether type B principals are better off 
in the partially organized case, the same, or worse ofi^ depends on the relative weights 
between the (negative) terms associated with the agent's variable fee and the (positive) term 
associated with the principals' payments of the agent's fixed fee. That is, type B principals 
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are better off, the same as, or worse off when type A principals organize then when they do 
not, depending on whether the negative terms outweigh, are offset by, or are outweighed by 
the positive term. Depending on outcome of the aggregate utility comparison we can then 
make the appropriate inferences concerning the welfare of individual type B principals under 
the two scenarios. • 
With these effects in mind, when at a prior stage where the decision of whether to 
organize or not must be made before any others, type A principals will perceive themselves 
as being better off remaining unorganized. Consequently, a smaller group of principals would 
not opt to organize if they had the choice to do so, even if this induces the agent to increase 
effort levels in a direction towards being second-best efiBcient. This result can be seen as 
perhaps a more insidious form of a failure of collective action. The posmlated segment of 
society that is most likely to organize fails to do so even if the public outcome of an agent's 
actions benefits them directly and not others.® Meaning that even if the good in question is 
public to certain types but private to others, collective action can still fail. As was shown and 
argued, this is partly due to the public nature of the fixed cost of achieving agent 
participation and the inability of the participants to overcome their individual incentives to 
fi-ee ride on the contributions of others irrespective of which type they may be. The other 
factor contributing to this result is the opportunity that principals have for indirectly 
extracting income fi-om others by punishing the agent for outcomes that are not of direct 
concern to them - a "kind of compensation that principals might demand fi-om the agent, for 
her serving others even though the agent's tasks are independent of one another. This 
interpretation, while maybe helpful is slightly misleading. These negative payments simply 
arise because the principals have the ability to demand them and within the climate 
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examined, it is in their interest to do so. We might also expect or suppose, whether in the 
presence of an outside central authority or within, say a multilateral agency where it is stated 
in the charter itself, that such punishment mechanisms are prohibited. If so, a question then 
arises as to whether the group most likely to organize actually now has the incentive to do so. 
This is the question we now turn to. 
2.1.1 Partial Organization with Simultaneous Moves and Payment Restrictions 
It was shown earlier that a restriaion of the principals' ability to punish the agent not 
only partitioned the effects of common agency so as to be limited by type, but it also had the 
salutary impact of strengthening agent incentives and increasing effort. It then should not be 
surprising that these effects also occur here if at the outset, there existed an outside agency or 
central authority capable of making and enforcing this restriaion. Assuming this is so, then 
in the simultaneous move game, the restriction P,®' = 0 is set for each i s n® and for the 
organized principals, the restriction, = 0, holds. The resulting first-order conditions for 
both types are then 
(28) <Df-P,'^-ra„c„P,'^=0 
(28a) Pf; cDf - pf - ra^c^P® = 0. 
Summing over all n® in equation (28a) and solving each equation separately to find the 
agent's unit fees give 
(29) P,™'^ = 
l + ra„c„ 
(29a) P^"^ = 
1 + n rOjjC^j 
where the "R" added to the superscript again refers to the fact that certain payments are 
42 
restricted. These results are an improvement when compared to the unrestricted common 
agency case. However, if our benchmark case were the restricted but unorganized common 
agency case discussed earlier, the solutions denoted by "RU" - equations (19) and (i9a) - we 
see that the only change is a strengthening of the unit payment for gj outcomes and therefore: 
af®*^ > af" and af''^ = . Using this case as our benchmark, we can state the following 
result for the simultaneous move game played between organized and unorganized 
principals. 
Proposition 2: If 1< rt^ CrcruC] jJ', then organizing type A principals are either better off, the 
same, or worse off than would be the case if punishments were restricted and both types 
remained unorganized and moved simultaneously. Unorganized type B principals are worse 
off 
Argument: The argument for comparison of type B principals rests on the determination of 
- sign(Q®-^" - ). Retaining the equal cost sharing assumption gives the following 
result for both types of principals (k = A, B): 
Qk.Ru .qicj-OR^ (i/2)(iL-)[QRu -QPOR] 
n 
- (l/2)(—)(ra„ -—)[(?,"")= -(?,"»)']<0. 
n c,, 
Thus for type B principals, 
y BJ>OR _ _^qB.RU _ QB.POR ) > Q ' 
Given the assumption, 1< n'^(raiiCn)^, and the arguments made above regarding the agent's 
fixed payments, it then follows that the expression 
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UA.RU _uA.POR 
_ qAJ^DR ^ 
is negative, zero, or positive depending on whether the negative first term dominates, is 
offset, or outweighed by the positive second term. • 
On an additional note, it is possible to give alternative interpretations for the 
requirement, 1< n^rCTnCu)^ The first is, that this holds as long as n'^ is sufficiently large, 
that the restricted but unorganized common agency, has a significant amount of principals 
vying for the agent's attentions. This would be required if it were the case that 0 < rcJuCi i < 
1. However, if rauCn > I, this implies that dQ/dPi > 0, which we earlier argued was the 
more intuitive case - that the impact on agent's risk premium is greater than the response of 
the agent to an additional unit  of Pi.  
Except for the possibility where the negative term associated with the agent's variable 
fees does not dominate the increase in the fixed fee payments, the last proposition shows that 
when punishments are restricted, collective action is likely to improve matters. Thus in a 
simultaneous move game and using the analogy of working within the context of a 
multilateral agency, we can say that with restrictions, the organized group's interests can be 
made to be roughly consistent with the organization's. A similar interpretation would also 
hold for organized groups in a conmiunity setting with local public goods. 
2.2 Intervention by a Central Authority 
The first section of this chapter contains a rather gloomy prognosis for collective 
artion under the conditions given, especially in the absence of any restriction on certain 
marginal payments, i.e. sufficient incentives fail to exist for the most likely types to coalesce 
(l+n-'ra^c,,)-  (l  + ra„c„) '  
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and improve upon the third-best allocation. Although this does not prove the case for central 
intervention (since cash transfers among principals can still conceivably take place), it is 
natural to inquire or at least consider a particular form (or forms) that intervention may take. 
In this section, one main alternative is considered, so remedies are by no means unique, but 
what may initially recommend this one, as opposed to some other form, is that it attempts to 
implement a solution that is consistent with decentralized behavior. It is claimed that this is 
an improvement over the typical "black-box" method used earlier, from which we were able 
to obtain our earlier second-best benchmarks. This was accomplished through the use of the 
simplifying assumption of unified principal behavior, but one could very well have also 
assumed the presence of a benevolent social planner. In this section, such behavior or 
acquiescence by the principals to the planner's wishes are not taken for granted. More 
importantly as long as the central authority can restrict payments that are "punishing" rather 
than "rewarding", it doesn't matter if one group organizes or not - the model to be presented 
is still capable of implementing second-best levels of agent effort. At least with respect to 
incentives that affect the actions of the agent at the margin, the restrictions effectively 
destroy the linkage between the two types of principals via the agent. However, there remains 
the question of how the burden of the agent's fixed fee is to be distributed across principals. 
Yet again this aspect of the problem requires additional structure so that this determination 
can be made. 
That said, given the four-stage game to be later described and analyzed, it is possible 
to attain the second-best outcome. The central authority moves twice; first when setting the 
restrictions on punishments, and subsequently in the third stage, after the principals, when 
choosing the proper level of subsidies to make to the agent. In the second stage principals 
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must correctly anticipate the planner's response to their choices. Both nonetheless, must 
condition their payments to the agent on observable output rather than on the agent's 
(nonobservable) effort. The game however, has multiple equilibria. Yet even here, because of 
the sequential movement between principals and the central plaimer and the partitioning 
effect of the restrictions, this is not quite the problem it can be in a simultaneous move game 
played amongst players (principals) of many different types. 
But before we turn to describing the overall structure of the model, we first 
investigate another approach for strengthening agent incentives which also allows for 
decentralized behavior. This approach involves direct payment of subsidies to principals and 
is augmented by suitable payment restrictions. With these two tools, subsidies and 
restrictions, it can be easily shown that it is possible to entice the agent into choosing levels 
of effort that are second best. There is however one drawback in implementing this scheme: 
the level of subsidies required to induce the principals into increasing their marginal rewards 
may, in the final analysis, be too high in relation to the overall value that the principals place 
on a unit of the agent's output. Far from setting up a straw man, the important lesson to be 
learned is that in evaluating the effectiveness and worthiness of implementing such a subsidy, 
this consideration should not be ignored. 
2.2.1 Common Agency and Piquovian Subsidies to Principals 
Recall that an imposition of the restrictions; = 0 for every i e n'^ and P,®' = 0 for 
all i e n®, is not sufficient for achieving a second-best outcome when there is more than one 
principal of each type. Therefore in order to reach the second-best allocation, this policy tool 
is supplemented with an additional one. Given that the principals of a certain type still pay 
too little an amount when rewarding the agent's effort in the dimension pertinent to them. 
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assume that the central authority offers each principal of a given type a unit subsidy. That is, 
for each unit of the agent's output, the central authority pledges to pay a subsidy of sf* to a 
principal belonging to type A, and a subsidy sf to a principal who is type B. These subsidies 
effectively reduce the cost of rewarding agent effort for each principal and therefore 
encourages them to spend more. 
Other than the addition of these subsidies and restrictions, the principals solve a 
similar problem as before. For example, a principal of type A chooses Q'^ and P,'^ in order 
to 
Maximize cDf'a,+1^-sf')a,-Q'^ 
s.t Q + P,''a, +P®a, -(l/2)r(cy„(P,'')' -ha3,(P®)-]-C(a,,a,) >0 
a, =a,(P,^). 
Observe that the principal's budget constraint has been substituted into the objective function 
and that the effect of the planner's restrictions have already been incorporated into the 
agent's incentive compatibility constraint along with the assumption that cu = 0. Following 
already established procedures, we then can write the first-order conditions for both types of 
principals; 
(30) Of+sf-P,^-ra,.c„P,'^=0 
(30a) Of + sf - Pf - = 0. 
Thus if the central planner pays a unit subsidy of sj^ = ra,,c,,P,'^^''^ and s®' = to 
each principal of type A and B respectively^, it is possible to attain the second-best variable 
fees and effort levels of the agent; 
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cf)'^ cb'^ p^Ai.5b ^ ^^ p= —TJ , af = (1 / c„ 
l + rcT„c„ l + rcrnC„ 
fft®' cb® 
pB'.'f = ^2 pB^ = ^2 a? = (1 / )P®-^ . 
l + rCT22C22 " l + rCijC^ 
Comparing P,'^"^ to P,^ under normal common agencv ( P, = ^ ) or to 
l + nrCT„c„ 
where payments are ah-eady restricted, = —! ), it is easy to see that 
I + n rcy,,c,, 
the subsidy induces each principal to strengthen their marginal reward to the agent. However, 
in order to realize this proper aligimient of incentives requires the central ziuthority to expend 
Si and S2 per unit of the agent's expected output where s, = sj^ = (n'^ - l)ra„c,,P,'^ and 
s, = sf = (n® - Ora^c^P® . As can be seen, if rcjncu > 1, the governmental authority 
can expect to pay a substantial multiple of the aggregate variable fees paid by each type of 
principal. In addition, these subsidies exceed the aggregate value that the principals place on 
a unit of output (<I)^, k = A, B, j = 1,2 but when k = A, j * 2 and when k = B, j 1). 
Moreover if these subsidies must be financed by taxes on these same principjils, whether they 
are distortionary or not, it is clear that this policy would no longer be practical let alone 
politically feasible. Hence in the absence or falling short of finding and taxing fixed rents 
fi^om another sector in the economy (in which case the policy may be justified if the transfer 
can be made in a lump sum fashion), there is not much to reconmiend this modified subsidy 
policy for increasing the agent's levels of effort. Consequently we turn towards describing an 
alternative approach, and though this approach includes the possibility of fi"ee riding by the 
principals, the onus of funding subsidies will not be as great. 
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2.2.2 Subsidizing the Common Agent 
Consider that instead of paying subsidies to each principal, the central authority pays 
a unit subsidy for each dimension of output directly to the agent and that payment is made 
only after the principals have already pledged their contributions. The structure of the game 
is described as follows: 
Stage I; The central authority moves first, its goal is to implement a second-best equilibrium. 
In order to do so, it restricts payments to the agent that are not directly and positively linked 
to output and a given type's well-being, i.e. P,'^ = 0 for every i e n'^ and P,®' = 0 for all i s 
n®. 
Stage 2: Each principal chooses Q*" and P^'" (k = A, B, j = 1, 2 but when k = A, j 2 and 
when k = B, j * 1) in order to maximize individual utility while anticipating the responses of 
both the agent and the central authority and taking as given the government's prior 
restrictions and payments by other principals. 
Stage 3: Given payments by the principals, the central authority makes additional variable 
payments, Si and S2, to the agent. These are chosen to maximize the aggregate utility of the 
principals subject to the following constraints; the central authority's budget constraints, the 
principals' resource constraint, and the agent's participation and incentive compatibility 
constraints. 
Stage 4: Agent chooses ai and a2 given the choices made by all principals and the central 
authority. 
Again the solution concept is sub-game perfection, we therefore start by 
characterizing the agent's behavior under the impact of receiving an additional variable fee 
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from another party. The agent's certainty equivalent of wealth is now written as 
=Q + (P,^ +s,)a, +(P5 +s,)a, -(l/2Ma„(P,^ +s,)- +s,)-]-C(a,,a,). 
From which, we derive the first-order conditions; 
(31) (P,^+s,)-C,(a„a,) = 0 
(31a) (P®+s,)-C,(a,,a,) = 0. 
As can be seen, the agent's optimal responses to changes in the central authority's policy 
variables are equivalent to responses towards changes in the relevant aggregate payments 
chosen by the principals, 
(32) d2i\ldsi =<5ai/5P,'^= I/cu 
(32a) oaj/dsj = 0^.2!dVf= I/C22 • 
We can also see from the specification of the problem and the above conditions that the agent 
is indifferent as to the source from which she receives these funds. 
At the third stage of the game the central authority's problem is to choose si and S2 to 
Maximize <Dfa, +cD?a, +1'" +1® -Q"" -Q® -P®a, -t?a, 
s.t. Q + (P,-' + s, )a, + (Pf + s, )a, - (1 /2)r{a„ (P,*" + s,)' + (P,® + s,)'] - C(a,, a,) > 0 
&i — ^] (Pi'^iS,), a, =a,(P2 ,s,), t, = s,, t, = s,. 
Note that the central authority's budget constraints, tf = s, and t® = s,, not only ensure that 
its variable fees to the agent are fully funded, but also that no group is favored at another's 
expense. After incorporation of all constraints into the objective function and taking 
derivatives with respect to the two choice variables, the resulting first-order conditions are 
si; (Df ^-ra„(P,''+s,)-C,^ = 0 
(TS, OS, 
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a: 4>;^-ro_fP?-s,)-C.^ = 0. 
* OS, ' " 'OS, 
Using results from equations (31) through (32a) these conditions can be rewritten as 
(33) si; cDf-ra.,c„(P,'^ ^s,)-(P,'^ ^s,) = 0 
(33a) S2: <!>?-ra2C^(P®-(-s.)-(P®-s,) = 0. 
Solving each of these for si and S2 respectively, gives the central authority's response 
functions to changes in and P5; 
(34) ^^^»f-(l^ra„c„)P-
1 + rCT,,c,, 
(34a) S; =—= =—= 
1 rff^c^j 
with partial derivatives of 
OS, OS, 
The expressions for (35) show that subsidies to the agent respond negatively, dollar-for-
dollar, to changes in and Pf. This "crowding out" effect however, is just a result of the 
agent's indifference to the sources of her fimding. 
Implicit within the context of the solution to the central planner's problem is the 
setting of the individual tax schedules for the principals; tf and tf . Insofar as s, is a 
function of P,'^ and s, is a function of Pf and given the two budget constraints, we can 
specify tf (P,*^) and tf (Pf') as being representations of the schedules facing each 
individual principal as they solve their individual maximization problem. Each principal, 
depending on type, will take into account the appropriate responses of the authority when 
51 
determining their variable payments in the second stage. Although si and S2 may decline for 
every unit that P,'^ and P®' are increased, tf* and tf will also be respectively a function of 
these payments and so one way or another, marginal incentives for the agent will be provided 
for. 
Without loss of generality we focus on the problem facing a type A principal. The 
budget constraint for such an individual is now written as y'^ + Q'^ + =1'^ 
After substituting Ai's budget constraint and the agent's participation constraint into Ai's 
utility function, the principal's problem is then to choose P,'^ to 
Maximize Of a, +s,a, -tfa, -!-P,'^^'"a, +Q® +(Pf +S;)a, +1'^ 
-(l/2)r(a,,(P,'^ +s,)- +s,)-]-C(a,,a,) 
s.t. a, =a,(P^s,), a3=a,(P^s,), tf =tr'(P,'^) 
0 < P,-^ < cDf 
The first-order conditions that characterize the solution for a typical principal of type A at 
this stage of the game are 
r A 
(36) <D J da, ds. 
as, 5P,^^ 
+ s -t At 
aa. 5s, 
+ 
^ 5s, atf* ^ 
as. ap,^J [ap,-^ 5P,-J 
a, 
^ oa, ga, 5s, ^ 
as, ap,^ ^ 
+  = 0  
(36a) 
(36b) 
A.^P,'^ =0 A.7 > 0 P ~  > 0  
-p,'^) = o 
The Lagrange multipliers and jif , are associated with the lower and upper bound 
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^3 5s 
restrictions for . Given that—!- = —!-and —V" = -I, the first-order conditions can be 
5P,'' as, 5P,^ 
rewritten as 
(37) 
(37a) P,^ =0 > 0 P,^ > 0 
(37b) -P{^ )  =  0  laf > 0 <Df - P,-^ > 0.  
If the central authority's policy responses to a change in Ai's variable payment are offsetting, 
then the first term in equation (37) is equal to zero. It is assumed that this is the case - that 
the authority increases the amount of the subsidy at the same rate it increase Ai's taxes for 
every unit not paid voluntarily by the principal towards the marginal reward of the agent. 
T h u s  =  | j . f  ,  a n d  f r o m  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  w e  s e c u r e  t h e  r e s u l t ;  P , ' ^  s  [ 0 , ] .  
Similar arguments also give Pf' e ]. These hold for all principals according to their 
type. 
At first glance, the continua of multiple equilibria are somewhat disconcerting. Each 
of these is however limited to a certain number of principals of a given type. This should 
facilitate the choice of which equilibrium to focus on, given similar interests. Further, given 
that these choices will be confined to being made noncooperatively among principals of the 
same type, it is proposed that of these, three equilibria emerge as likely candidates. Focusing 
only on choices of type A principals, they, along with their following implications for s,, 
P,'^ , and s, + P,'^, are; 
i) if P,-^ = 0 V i e n^ 
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then s, = Of 
l + ra„c„ 
, P,^ =0, and s, +P,^ = 
ii) if P,-^ = c&f V i e n\ 
Of 
l + ra,,c, 
then s, =- rcj„c n^n 
l + ro,,c, 
o f ,  P , ^ = O f ,  a n d s , + P , ' '  =  O^ 
I y l + ra„c„ 
iii) if P,'^ = Of 
l + rcT„c„ 
V i s 
O"^ , of 
then s, = 0, P,'^ = ' and s, + P, = 
l + rcr„c„ l + ro„c„ 
Each of these cases is described separately. In case (i), each principal chooses not to pay the 
agent directly. The central government takes up the slack and taxes each principal 
accordingly. In this case, the problem reduces to a typical social planning problem with fiilly 
funded subsidies and no interaction between the principals and the agent. For case (ii), Ai 
pays a variable fee equal to its marginal valuation of expected output. In effect, each 
principal, in setting P,'^ = Of', also relinquishes "individual control" in designing the agent's 
incentives knowing that even though it "overpays" in the sense of the structure and overall 
goal of the game, the central authority will tax the agent and rebate the amount overpaid back 
to the principal. For scenario (iii), each principal chooses a level of P,'^ that is consistent 
with implementing the second-best outcome and accordingly no intervention is required by 
the central authority. Thus assuming that all principals of a certain type focus on a single 
equilibrium and that each can also agree, whether cooperatively or noncooperatively, on the 
allocation of payments for the agent's fixed fee, it is possible to implement the second-best 
allocation. 
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The central planner in setting the rxiles or the institutional framework for which the 
game between itself the principals, and the agent is to be played, chooses the restrictions 
P,'^= P,®' = 0 in order to implement the second-best allocation. As has been shown, these 
choices are consistent with the planner's objective. 
With the administration of restrictions, subsidies, and taxes, the central authority may 
appear to have a lot on its hands. A less sanguine view may be more realistic. For example, a 
more practical alternative is for the authority to limit itself to restricting certain payments and 
encouraging collective action among principals of each type. If successful, even the larger 
group may overcome the free riding problem and second-best efficiency may be achieved 
without the use of subsidies and taxes, at least as these tools are described here. 
Finally, we have yet to discuss the determination of the allocation of the agent's fixed 
fee to be paid by the principals. As argued earlier, this can be settled by negotiation or 
bargaining among the parties. In the case of the central authority ensuring the strength of the 
marginal incentives, the problem then becomes a cost allocation game between the 
principals. The outcome determining the distribution of the fixed fee, again, presumably 
depends on the relative bargaining powers of the principals and is possibly influenced by 
whether certain types of principals organize or not, and if so, whether it gives them a 
strategic advantage over principals that remain unorganized. If the central authority only 
provides restrictions, we are then back to the case summarized in the Proposition 2 at the end 
of the last section. 
23 Partial Organization with Sequential Moves 
In Section 2.1, it was assumed that one of two types of principals could choose to 
organize in a prior stage and in the subsequent stage, both types played a simultaneous game 
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- choosing payments to be made to the agent while taking the others' payments as given 
while fully anticipating the effects that such payments have on agent effort and participation. 
In this section, we follow a similar line of inquiry concerning the viability of partial 
cooperation albeit in a game where the two types of principals move sequentially. Within this 
context, we retain the assumption that the smaller numbers of type A principals enable them 
to be the most likely candidates to organize. In addition, it is also assumed that they are the 
most inclined to move first. Although the choice of roles is not modeled here, we might posit 
that type A principals fulfill an incumbency-like position with regard to setting up and 
running the common agency that provides benefits to other potential members. In such a 
scenario, type A principals when moving first, have the incentive to consider the impact of 
their payments on the agent and the other principals in addition to ensuring the participation 
of both the agent and type B principals. 
As usual, the equilibrium concept used is sub-game perfection and since the agent's 
behavior has already been characterized in Section 2.1, we now proceed with the 
characterization of behavior of unorganized type B principals since they move after 
organized type A principals but before the agent. Given that every member i of type B 
principals all move after group A, each then essentially faces a similar problem as they did in 
the Section 2.1. Thus each Bi chooses Q®', P,®', and P®' subject to the agent's participation 
and incentive compatibility constraints and their OAvn budget constraint while taking the 
organized group's choices as given. Following similar procedures as before, this gives what 
should be by now the familiar first-order conditions for type B principals, 
(38) P®': -P®'-ro„c„P, =0 
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(38a) Pf: Of - Pf - ra^c^P, = 0. 
Summing over all Bi, we then can obtain expressions for the aggregate variable payments 
peiid by type B principals as a function of group A's variable payments. These are: 
(39) pB ^_ n^rp^„c„P,^ 
1 + n rOjjC,, 
(39a) Pf = n^rg^c^P,-^ 
I + n ru^c^ 
From these expressions, we can also obtain the optimal aggregate response of type B 
principals to changes in type A's payments, 
(40) 
dPf' I + n®rcy,,c,, 
cPf n®r(T^c„ (40a) . - B 
cP, 1 + n 
The slope of these response functions state that unorganized type B principals as a whole 
respond negatively to changes in group A's marginal incentive payments to the agent. 
As in the simultaneous move game, the allocation of the agent's fixed fee remains 
undetermined among unorganized type B principals. Since the burden will be shared amongst 
principals of the same type, the most likely candidate for selection is the rule of equal cost 
sharing. Assuming that group A's fixed fee is determined in the first stage along with P,^ and 
P^ - their marginal payments to the agent - and given the fact that type B principals 
determine the allocation of their portion of the fixed fee such that the agent's participation 
constraint is binding, we can write 
(41) Q® =-Q'' -P®a, -P.-'a, -Pfa, -P^^a, +(l/2)r[CT„P,' +a22P,'] + C(a,,a,), 
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the expression for that portion of the agent's fixed fee paid by type B principals as a function 
of group A's marginal and fixed payments to the agent. 
Group A thus takes into account the overall response of type B principals to its choice 
of P,'^, , and Q'^, and that whatever the choices, if B participates, type B principals will 
ensure the agent's participation. So that group A does not set Q'^ to negative infinity, a 
realistic lower bound must be established. One way to realistically represent this, is to restrict 
A's choice set (P,'^, P,'^, Q'^) so that it also ensures the participation of type B principals 
given P,®(P,'^), P®(P,^), and the agent's incentive compatibility constraint. Group A's 
problem then is to 
Maximize cD;^a, +- P,^a, - P^'^a, -
subject to +1® - P®a, - P®a, -Q® > 0 
a, =a,(P,J andPf =P;(P;) j=I,2 
and equation (41).' 
Using (41) to substitute out for Q® in the aggregate indirect utility function of type B 
principals, the problem can be rewritten as 
Maximize cl);^a,+1'^-P,'°'a,-P,'^a,-Q'^ 
subjectto <I)2a, +1® +Q'^ +P/'a2 -(l/2)r[a,,P,^ +a„P2 ]-C(a,,a,) >0 
a ,=a , (P , )  andP®=P®(P3'^)j=l,2.  
Using the participation constraint'" for type B principals to solve for and plugging the 
result into group A's objective function, the problem now becomes 
Maximize Ofa, +<I>?a2 +1"^ +1® -(l/2)r[a„P,^ +a22P2 ]-C(a,,ai) 
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subject to a J = a^(Pj) and P® = P®(Pj'^) j = 1,2 . 
Given the above stnjcture of the sequential move game, it is now easy to see that it collapses 
into a problem where the outcome will be constrained Pareto efficient - i.e. group A's 
choices will implement the second-best outcome. This is, in fact, confirmed, as we now show 
after deriving the initial first-order conditions; 
pA . 
-c, 
5a, aP, ^ oa, 5P, B \ 
ap, ap,^  ap, 0p;5p,^ j -ra„P, 
^ap, ap, apf^ 
^ap,^ ^ap,® ap,'' ^ 
^aa, ap, aa, ap, ap,®^ 
+ -
ap, ap,-" ap, ap,® ap,'" j = 0 
P,''; O? 
ap, aa, aP; ap® ^ 
ap, ap.'' ap, ap,® ap,^ , -rcT^P, 
ap, ap, ap. 
-+ 
B A 
ap,'' apf ap,''^ 
-c. 
^aa, ap, aa, ap, ap,®  ^
ap, ap,'' a^p, ap,® ap,^  ^= 0 . 
Using the expressions firom the agent's first-order conditions (a^aPj - l/Cjj and Pj - Q where 
j = 1, 2) and rearranging, we obtain 
(42) c&f-ra„c„P,-P, =0 
(42a) <1)® - ra^c^P, - P, = 0. 
Solving each for Pj, j = 1, 2 we derive the expressions for the aggregate marginal payments to 
the agent: 
<Df (43) 
(43a) 
P,«« = 
pPOS _ 
•^2 ~ 
l + ra„c„ 
<D? 
l + ra„c 72 
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where the superscript "POS" denotes the solution pertaining to the partially organized case 
with sequential moves. Using the relationships 
P, =P,^+?«(?,^) 
P, =P^ +P,®(P,®) 
or 
p,^ =p, 
P: =P: -P, (P^ ) 
and (39) and (39a) we find that 
(44) 
(44a) 
\..pos _ (1 + n rg,,Cn) 
l + rcy„c„ 
p; A.POS 0°(n°-l)rg^c^ 
1 + ra^c. 
And by using (44) and (44a) respectively in (39) and (39a), we also get 
(45) pB.Pos ^ Ofn°ra„c,i  
l + ra,,c n 
(45a) »B.POS 
1 + n rtT,,c,, 
l+ra^^c^ -n^(n^ -^(rgaC^)'  
1 + ra^c^ 
Finally, using the appropriate expressions we determine the expressions for the agent's 
actions, 
(46) ar = —p; POS 
(46a) afs = ^p,^ POS 
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and after substituting out for each a[°®, j = 1, 2, and after some slight rearranging, we also 
obtain the expression for group A's portion of the agent's fixed fee: 
(47) QA.POS _ _(J)B _|_pPOS _jB _pA.POS _I_pPCIS pA.POS 1 pPOS 
" c,, ' ' c„ ' " • 
+ (l/2)(P,~")'[ra„ +—l+(l/2)(Pf=)=[ro„ j. 
1 ^22 
Contrary to what one may expect, we see by observing (45) and (45a), that not only 
do type B principals receive a "subsidy" or a payment from the agent for gi outcomes, but 
also for g2 as well. These payments are, however, indirectly obtained from the "large" 
marginal payments made to the agent by group A. By scrutinizing expressions (44) and 
(44a), we see that these marginal payments to the agent by group A far outweigh the group's 
marginal valuations of the outcomes related to each of the agent's actions, or in short: 
pA.pos 0A pA Q Accordingly, in order for type A principals to achieve any 
benefit from organizing within the common agency framework, the group must either receive 
a fixed payment from the agent (a negative Q'^), or pay less in terms of their portion of the 
agent's fixed fee (a lower Q'^), as compared to either the unorganized sequential move case, 
or if the first-mover advantage is somehow an endogenous choice faced by type A principals, 
the partially organized simultaneous move case.'' However these variable fees serve a dual 
purpose. Not only do they adjust the aggregate variable fees received by the agent so that the 
agent will implement the second best level of effort, but they also guarantee the participation 
of the agent by ensuring the participation of type B principals. If^ in the sequential move 
game, partial cooperation is individually beneficial to type A principals, it is possible to 
implement the second-best outcomes without the aid of intervention by a central authority. 
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To check whether this is the case, we need to compare group A's welfare under the partially 
organized sequential move scenario with that obtained in the unorganized sequential move 
game. But before doing so, consider the fact that we can compare group A's welfare under 
the partially organized sequential move game with that which the group receives in the 
partially organized simultaneous move game. The argument can be made as follows. Given 
that type B principals respond in a Coumot-Nash fashion to group A's choice of fees to the 
agent, group A can achieve the same level of welfare by choosing to play the same strategies 
in the sequential move game as in the simultaneous move game. However, given that we 
observe group A choosing to implement different strategies in the leader-follower game, it 
must be the case that the group and therefore type A principals are, at least, individually no 
worse off then they would be in the simultaneous move game. Thus we can state the 
following result. 
Result 1: The sequential move game yields the same or higher level of utility to group A than 
what they would obtain in the simultaneous move game. 
We now turn to the case where both types of principals remain unorganized but type A 
principals retain their first-mover advantage vis-a-vis type B principals. After deriving results 
for this case, we can then determine whether type A principals are better off cooperating than 
not in this game of sequential moves. Once having done this, we eittempt to extend our results 
to see if we can say anything about A principals' welfare if the very act of organizing confers 
the first-mover advantage. 
2.3.1 Common Agency with Sequential Moves 
The structure of this game is similar to that described as above. The only real 
difference is that each type A principal, though still retaining the ability to move first, no 
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longer acts jointly with other type A principals. Instead each type A principal, in the first 
stage, takes the others' contributions as given while anticipating the aggregate responses of 
type B principalis and the single agent. Thus in this noncooperative or unorganized sequential 
move game, Ai's problem is to choose Q'^, P,'^, and in order to 
Maximize O^a,+1^-Pj'^a,-P^'^a,-Q'^ 
subject to +1® - P®a, - P®a, -Q® > 0 
a^ =a^.(P^) and Pf =P;(P;) j=l,2 
and equation (41). 
Combining equation (41) with B's participation constraint, solving for Q'^, and then 
plugging the result into Ai's objective function we can rewrite the maximization problem as 
Maximize Of'a, +cDSa, +1'^ +1® +P^^->a, 
-(l/2)r[cT„P,' +a^P,-]-C(a„a,) 
subject to a J = a j (Pj) and Pf = Pf (P^'') j = 1,2 . 
Following similar procedures as before, we can obtain the resulting first-order conditions, 
(48) P,-^ : Of - P,'^ - ra„c„P, = 0 
(48a) P;-^ : - P,'^ - ra^c^P, = 0. 
For future reference, note that the presence of the term O? in (48a) will ensure that 
the outcome of this game will differ firom the simultaneous unorganized common agency 
game (see equation (12a)). Summing these conditions over all n"^ results in 
(49) (Df-P.-^-n^ra^c^P, =0 
(49a) -P^ - n'^rOj^c^jP, = 0. 
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Breaking up the term P, into and Pf in (49), and plugging the expressions for P,®, we 
use the resulting expression to solve for P,'^. Following similar procedures in (49a) gives the 
expression for P,'^. Using these results, we can then solve for P,® and P,®. Label these 
solutions with a superscript "US" to denote the unorganized common agency problem with 
sequential moves: 
(50) ,A.u-s ^ Of(l + n®n7,iC„) 
' I + nrCT,,c,, 
(50a) ,A.L-s _ n^(t);[l  + (n® -l)rg^c^] 
1+nra^c^ 
(50b) 3.US _ n ra,,Cn 
l + nra,,c,, 
(50c) P°-^" = - -
l-r-n rcj^c. 
l  + nrg^c^ -n'^n'^rg^C;; -n'^n®(n® -l)( ' 'gr:^r!) 
l4-nra^c^ 
Also by adding equations (50) and (50b) and (50a) together with (50c) we obtain expressions 
for P,'-'^ and Pf, 
(51) pUS _ or 
l + nrCT,,c,, 
(51a) ^ (n'^+1)<D® 
1 +nra^c. 
And rather than showing solutions for a,"^ and a^^, it is sufficient to remember that these are 
but simple increasing monotonic transformations of P,^ and P,''® respectively. Using these 
results we can also derive 
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(52) 
+ (l/2)(p;^y-[m„ +—] + (l/2XP")'[rtj„ + 
C„ c 
•] .  
By observing the expressions in (50), (50b), and (51), we see that these solutions are 
no different from those obtained under the standard assumptions of common agency, where 
principals all act separately and move simultaneously. Thus at least in dimension of gi. type 
A principals choose to implement their Coumot-Nash strategy as opposed to choosing any 
other strategy given that type B principals are Stackelberg followers. However, type A 
principals do not play a similar strategy with regard to the agent's choice of task two. We 
also see from (50b) and (50c) that as in the partially organized, sequential move game, type B 
principals receive payments from the agent for both gi and gz outcomes. Given that type A 
principals choose a different level of payment at least with respect to g2 outcomes in the 
sequential move game than that selected in the simultaneous move game (see the game as 
depicted in Ch^ter 1), we can state our second result. 
Result 2: 77ie noncooperative sequential move game yields the same or higher level of utility 
to unorganized type A principals than what they would receive in the noncooperative 
simultaneous move game. 
Given these results, we can now check to see if type A principals actually have the 
incentive to cooperate and organize in the sequential move, common agency game. 
23.2 Comparison 
We start out by comparing the solutions derived in Section 2.3.1 to the second-best 
outcomes derived under partial cooperation. First, it is not to hard to see that P,^ > and 
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pTOs > pus and thereforeaf°® > and af'^ > a^^. That is, in the sequential move game, 
the aggregate marginal payments are stronger and therefore the agent's efforts, greater, when 
the lesser number of principals organize than when individual members of both types act 
unilaterally and separately. Analyzing the marginal payments by group gives the following: 
pA.POS ^ pA.US pA,POS ^ pA.US 
IpB.POS j  ^ jpB.US j  |pB.POS j  ^ jpB .USj  
From these we see that type A principals pay more as a group than when they act separately. 
We also see that type B principals receive higher levels of payments from the agent when 
type A principals are organized than when they are not, even though in either case, type B 
principals receive their reservation level of utility. 
Also with regard to group A's share of the agent's fixed fees, it can be shown that 
QA.POS QA.US YHIG holds whether type A principals receive more in terms of payments 
from the agent or has to pay less in fixed fees to the agent in the partially organized case as 
compared to the case where they act independently. Finally using the expressions below, 
+IA _pA.P0Saros _pA.POSaros _q^sos 
it is possible to show that type A principals are better off when organized, and hence in the 
sequential move game, not only are there incentives for type A principals to organize, but by 
doing so, the second-best outcome is implemented without the aid of a central authority. 
Proposition 3: Given a first mover advantage, type A principals are collectively and 
individually better off for having organized than not. 
Argument: In order to prove the claim, we need to compare group A's welfare in the 
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sequential move game under standard common agency assumptions with that obtained under 
partial cooperation. We thus need to demonstrate that the expression 
UA.P0S_UA.US ^ (DA^POS ^JA _ pAJOS^POS _ pA.POS^TOS _QA.POS 
-[(Dfa,"^ +1^ 
is positive. By making the appropriate substitutions and after some grouping of like-terms, it 
is possible to show that 
To 
(l4-ra),c,,)(l + nrCT,,Ci,)- ^ (l + rPiiC,,)^ 2(l-t-rg„c,,)-(l + nrai,c„) 
2 2 2 
r, (1 + ra22^22Xl + nrG^^C;^)" (n'^ -hl)"(l + ra^c^)^ 2(n'^ +l)(lT-rCT^c^)'(l-rnra^c^) 
2 2 2 
where 
r 
^ 0 ~ 
r, = 
c„ (l + ro„c„)'(l + nra„c„)' 
1 
c^ (l  + ra22C2)"(l  + nra;2C;2) '  
is positive. Since type A principals, in aggregate are better off when organized, individual 
type A principals can be all made potentially better off. Therefore type A principals have 
incentive to organize and implement the second-best solution given the strategic incentive in 
doing so. • 
These arguments and results seem to run counter to those found in Sandler (1992) and 
Varian (1994). It was shown there in a game of voluntary contributions to a public good with 
perfect information, that public provision is the same or lower when players move 
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sequentially rather than simuhaneously. Here however, the first-mover advantage encourages 
type A principals as a group to implement the second-best solution. In a model more closely 
related to the one explored here by Buchholz, Haslbeck, and Sandler (1998), a question arises 
whether the amount of the public good provided in a Stackelberg equilibrium is greater or 
smaller than the fiilly noncooperative solution. Their model is also a game of voluntary 
contribution to a public good, but with perfect information, and includes the possibility of 
partial cooperation. In the last section of their paper, members of the coalition also move first 
when determining their contributions, taking into account the reactions of the 
noncooperators. But as the authors mention, their results are inconclusive and as the authors 
hypothesize, within the context of their model, if cooperation is marginally profitable, one 
would expect to see a higher level of public provision. To the extent that we can compare 
these models, this claim seems to be reinforced by resuks obtained in this section. 
Finally using Proposition 3 and Result 2, we can string these results together to form 
another result. 
Result 3: Given that and > U^, then > U-". 
Thus, if obtaining the first-mover advantage is dependent on the choice of organizing, i.e. 
somewhat endogenous to the problem of partial cooperation (as argued in endnote eleven), 
there will be sufficient motivation for group A principals to form a coalition and improve 
upon the standard conmion agency, simultaneous move game. In fact, if these assumptions 
hold, the preferred and second-best outcome will always be implemented since the most 
likely group to organize can achieve a higher level of utility then possible by remaining 
unorganized. This is a rather strong result considering the fact that this can be accomplished 
without the aid of central intervention. Although this result should be tempered by the fact 
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that we did not explicitly model the choice of roles here, we have shown it is in the interest of 
one group to organize and that this leaves the remaining principals no worse off than before. 
The passive role played by the former principals, then, is at least consistent with the outcome 
of the game. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Although the model is quite specific, some of the results obtained in Sections 2.1 and 
2.3 are interesting. Given what is already known about the common agency problem, that full 
cooperation improves upon the fully noncooperative case, one might expect that partial 
cooperation would at least have the potential of improving efficiency within the specified 
model. However as argued in the simultaneous move case, there appears to be no inducement 
for the group considered most likely to form, to act and organize unilaterally. Despite what 
would be an improvement in efficiency, most of the benefits quite possibly accrues to the 
unorganized principals and, most likely, in maintaining the agent's participation. Nonetheless 
in the sequential move case, if it can be assumed that organization bestows a first-mover 
advantage, partial cooperation can actually result in an outcome that is second best. It was 
also shown that at least in certain cases, the rather negative result in Section 2.1 can be 
overturned when certain payments made to the agent are restricted. That is, in the restricted 
and simultaneous move case, it is possible that partial cooperation can occur and improve 
efficiency - at least in the organizing sector. 
One drawback of the analysis is not that one group was assumed to organize and the 
other not - for if all organized, we would be back to fully cooperative case - but rather that 
partial organization was potentially postulated to be predicated upon the group considered 
most likely to organize. Although results from Olson's Logic of Collective Action w«-e used 
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to argue the selection, the process seems somewhat arbitrary. However, given the structure of 
the model, it may be more sensible to address these issues within another context or with 
more amiable models. These topics are certainly important enough to warrant pursuit in the 
future. 
Finally, it was argued earlier that in examining the case for central intervention, we 
were not just setting up a straw man. It should be also added that we were not just interested 
in showing that it could be done - restoring efficiency - for it may invariably be the case. But 
rather the interest in presenting such a scenario was to inquire whether this could be done in a 
somewhat decentralized fashion. There it was implied in a heuristic or slightly loose fashion 
that the requirements needed to achieve a second-best outcome might appear to be too high, 
that it might be best if the central authority were to limit itself to restriaing certain payments 
to the agent while perhaps encouraging cooperation among the principals. On the other hand, 
there might be a weakness in this approach if the authority cannot adequately monitor these 
payments, since as was shown, partial cooperation can be self-defeating from the organizing 
group's point of view in the simultaneous move case. As for the sequential move game, it 
was demonstrated that there was no need for central intervention. In fact, if the central 
government placed restrictions on certain payments, this would actually inhibit type A 
principals from implementing the second-best outcome. Thus central intervention in this case 
would probably only make things worse. The foregoing analysis therefore may best be 
viewed as a cautionary tale for collective action and intervention within a conunon agency 
environment. 
70 
2.5 Notes 
' A slightly gimilar argument is made by Becker (1983), where it is argued that smaller groups tend to be more 
politically successfiil than larger ^ ups. 
~ When we talk of improved efBciency, we mean movements toward second-best outcomes in terms of the 
agent's marginal incentives and levels of effort. 
 ^For example, expression (26) is derived by substituting in expressions for a,, a,, P * . and P* (or equations 
(IS), (ISa), (14), and (14a) respectively) into group A's aggregate utility function. Similar substitutions are 
made, for example, to find the expression for U . 
" The assumption of equal cost sharing is made in order to impose some structure on the problem so that the 
determination of the d t^ribution of the agent's fixed fee can be made. One reason thai the assumption is not 
imposed at the outset is that it slightly alters some of the results and makes others unattainable or 
noncomparable to results already existing in the literature. 
 ^Tngtearf of tiding the rule of equal cost sharing we could argue that group A's bargaining power actually 
weakens and B's strengthen relative to the standard unorganized common agency case using Olson's hypothesis 
of the exploitation of the large by the small (Olson, I96S). Despite the &a that each type of principal benefits 
sepaiatefy in terms of the good or sendee th  ^receive from the agent's actions, both types benefit from 
en«airing the agent's participation, and the aggregate fixed fee represents part of the costs of engaging the agent 
And it is the splitting of this cost which the principals must bargain over or determine via some other method. In 
both cases, whether ty]]e A principals are unorganized or organized, they are always acting in relation to 
unorganized Qi)e B princip .^ In the former case when both types are unorganized, we must assume that 
sufBcient agreement or structures (such as cultural norms) exist so as to independently determine the burden of 
this cost. In the latter case, type A principals aa as one large principal in relation to many small type B 
principals. The effects of the organized group's actions now weighs greatly with respect to the outcome than 
(do) individual decisions by the remaining unorganized principals. In short, the organized group identifies more 
with the overall outcome and is more likely to ensure the engagement of the agent and getting her to provide 
them with the public good or service even though once engaged, the agent also provides similar services to 
others. Unorganized principals if they are aware of this, are then more likely to firee ride then they would if type 
A principals were not organized. It is the increased likelihood of this threat and the awareness on the part of 
type B principals for using it that could cause a relative shift in bargaining power. We should emphasize and 
qualify the word "relative'' since A may contnbute more in both cases - the argument is that A pays more as a 
group when organized then when not This argument would not change the results of Proposition 1 for type A 
principals but would for type B principals. If the argument holds, type B principals are unequivocally better off 
when A organizes than wten they do not 
 ^Given the fact that the bracketed terms in the expression for group A's utili^  comparison are positive as long 
as (n^* > n''^ , the above results hold even when the number of type A principals are greater than n .^ In the event 
that the bracketed terms are negative, type A principals may still be no better off organizing than not if the 
difference (Q  ^- is sufficiently positive to outweigh the (now) two negative terms in the aforementioned 
expression. 
 ^ If as argued in endnote 5, group A's bargaining power weakens and Bs' strengthens, the result for type A 
principals remains ambiguous but type B prindpals are unequivocally better off whenever type A principals 
organize. 
 ^ Where, for example, the superscript A(-i) on the marginal payment for the first output represents the marginal 
payments paid by all A-type principals except for principal AL 
Note that type A and Type B aggregate resource constraints have already been substituted into their respective 
utility functions. 
Type B's participation constraint will be binding at the optimum. 
" If the very act of organizing confers a first-mover advantage as a result of improved communication and 
coordination amongst the principals that not only allows the group to act decisively sooner but correctly 
anticipate the responses of those who remain unorganized, then in a sense, the choice of forming a coalition also 
simultaneously includes the choice of moving first 
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CHAPTER 3: CLUBS AND COST SHARING 
3.1 Introduction 
Club theory has a relatively long history and has helped bridge the theoretical gap 
between private and pure public goods. It has therefore provided a useful framework for 
addressing a wide variety of issues (Glazer, Niskanen, and Scotchmer (1997)). This chapter 
follows in tradition, while focusing attention on the potential relation between membership 
size and the concept of cost sharing in clubs. Although the important relationship between 
membership and provision has been extensively studied and used, see Comes and Sandler 
(1996) for an example of the former, and Sterbenz and Sandler (1992) for the latter, most 
studies have concentrated their attention on the effect of various alternative assumptions and 
scenarios on the level of club provision. Few studies have exclusively examined the impact 
of changes in a club's cost structure on membership. Oakland (1972) and Sandler and 
Tschirhart (1997) are, nonetheless, some exceptions. 
The purpose of this chapter then is to readdress this issue. The argument for the 
possibility of a relationship between a club's costs and membership is somewhat intuitive 
since as a club's cost rises, then so do the potential benefits of apportioning these costs out 
among an increased membership. The reverse may hold true if a club's costs fall. Admittedly 
these statements need to be more precisely qualified, preferably in well-defined models, but 
the intuition remains. Invariably exceptions are possible and if not exceptions, then at least 
inconclusive results, but in the models to be presented in this chapter, this posited 
relationship will provide the common thread for the understanding of our results. In the next 
section, we investigate the impact of agency costs resulting from asymmetric information on 
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the size of a given club's membership. In another setting, in Section 3.3, we look at the 
impact of an additional source of revenue that can reduce the club's need for cost sharing 
among a given number of club users. The final section concludes. 
3.2 The Principal-Agent Problem: An Application to Oubs 
It is well known that it is difficult to obtain but a few general results from even the 
simplest of hidden-action models (see for example, Grossman and Hart (1983), or for a less 
technical presentation and discussion, Salanie (1997)). However, with the appropriate 
assumptions, it can be shown in the case of the two-effort model, where each of the two 
levels of effort is associated with two possible outcomes, that it is relatively more costly to 
implement the higher level of effort when it is not observable, than when it is. The 
interpretation of this result can be explained as follows. Given the binding agent's 
participation constraint under both scenarios, the agent receives the same level of utility in 
either case. Yet because of the inability to directly contract on agent effon when it is not 
observable, it is essential, from an incentive point of view, to get the risk-averse agent to take 
on some risk. However, it then becomes necessary to compensate the agent with a higher 
level of expeaed payment than is needed to implement the same level of effort under 
conditions of perfect observability. In this latter case, the agent's payment can be fixed since 
it can be dirertly tied to the level of effort. Knowing the impact on the principal's costs to 
implement this (possibly) desired level of effort, we can then verify the prediction by Sandler 
and Tschirhart (1997) that the increased cost of agency can lead to larger club membership. 
3.2.1 The Model 
In order to demonstrate the above hypothesis we start by making the first simplifying 
assumption that potential club users, the principals in our model, are homogenous with 
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respect to their tastes and incomes. It is also assumed that they agree to band together to 
design the agent's contract for implementing the desired level of effort and to jointly 
determine a common variable of interest (i.e. club membership). This is accomplished by 
agreeing to maximize the utility of a representative member subject to the relevant principal-
agent constraints. One can think of this model as depiaing the situation of a member-owned 
club with the agent as the manager of a club-like facility where the manager's actions, of say, 
the running of a complex of condominiums or safeguarding a gated community or a local 
area of business, are hidden. 
As mentioned above, there are only two available levels of effort or actions from 
which the agent can choose. To streamline the presentation, we will only be concerned with 
the unified principals implementing what they consider to be the possible "best" action.' In 
addition, associated with each level of effort there are only two possible outcomes; a high (h) 
and a low (1) outcome. That is, in choosing one of the two levels of effort, a "best" level of 
effort and an "alternative" one, the agent influences the probability of each outcome. Let Tiik 
be the probability of outcome i, i = 1, h given the k''' action, where k = a, b and TCBC + TUhic = I • 
It is also assumed that action b stochastically dominates action a. This implies, here with 
strict inequality, that TChb > tha and Ttib < tcu. It should be noted that for more complicated 
models, additional assumptions such as the monotone-likelihood ratio property and the 
concavity of the distribution function condition, are sometimes made. But since there are 
only two outcomes, these assumptions here would be redundant (see Kreps (1990), p 600 for 
details). As will be seen, the reason for utilizing stochastic dominance is to ensure that the 
level of payment to the agent increases with the level of the outcome. Finally, assume that Cb 
> Ca, that the fixed cost of implementing action b is more costly to the agent, then 
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implementing alternative action a. 
The case to be analyzed is the standard one: of risk-neutral principals (with respect to 
the monetary payments to be made to the agent) and a risk-averse agent where the level of 
club provision, gj, is random to both parties. For each possible outcome i, a payment tj is 
specified by the principals to be paid to the agent. The representative club member's von 
Nuemann-Morgenstem (vNM) utility function has the following quasilinear form 
(1) u = U(gi,n) + Wi 
where Wi represents the net wealth of the principal for outcome i. It is assumed that U(.) is 
twice differentiable and concave in both arguments, increasing with respect to gi, and 
decreasing with respect to n. The expression for net-wealth in state i is defined as 
(2) Wi = w- t i /n 
where w is the representative member's total wealth, independent of the possible states of the 
world, and the expression t/n, represents the cost sharing agreement among the principals, 
i.e., they share the expenses of the incentive scheme designed for the agent equally. Note that 
ti is set before gi is realized, so that the level of payment is made contingent on the possibility 
of a certain event occurring. It should also be mentioned that even though n represents the 
number of users of the club good, n is treated as a continuous variable as is standard 
procedure in the club literature. Lastly, the agent's vNM utility fiinaion is assumed to be 
additively separable and is given by 
(3) V = v(ti)-Ck 
for i = 1, h and k = a, b, where v(.) is strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, and 
strictly increasing in ti. 
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The representative principal's maximization problem then is to maximize expected 
utility given that the agent is to exert effort level b, subject to the agent's participation and 
incentive compatibility constraints. That is, the principals agree to choose th, ti, and a, to 
(4) Maximize Tty, [UCg^, n) + w - ^ ] + [U(g,, n) + w - ^ ] 
n n 
subject to TCy, v(th) + 7t^v(t,) - Cfc > 0 
^hbV(th)-i-7r^v(t,)-Cb > 7th.v(tJ + :Cuv(t,)-C,. 
We first examine the case where there is no incentive problem, where effort is perfectly 
observable and then, the case where effort is not observable. 
3.2.2 Observable EfTort 
When effort is observable, there is no need for the incentive compatibility constraint. 
The problem then can be seen as choosing th, ti, and n to 
(5) Maximize Tthb[U(gh,n) +w-^] + 7t,b[U(g,,n) + w-^] 
n n 
subjectto 7Cu,v(tJ + 7c^v(t,)-Cb >0. 
Since it is possible to lower payments to the agent and still obtain the agent's participation as 
long as the constraint is satisfied, the participation constraint will be binding at the optimum. 
Using X as the Lagrange multiplier, the first-order conditions are 
(6) t,: = ^ '=1^1 
nv(ti) 
(6a) n: 7thb[U„(gi..n) + -^] + 7tn,[U„(g„n) + -^] = 0 
n" n' 
(6b) X: 7tu,v(tJ + 7c^v(t,)-Cb =0. 
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Using these conditions, we can easily obtain the results shown below. 
Result 1: Observable effort 
(Li) t, = t, = t 
(l.ii) v(t) = Cb 
(l.iii) -KbnU„(gh,n) + 7t^nU„(g,,n)] = - . 
n 
Together, the two conditions from (6) imply (l.i), that the agent receives a fixed payment in 
return for implementing effort level b. This result can then be applied to the remaining first-
order conditions to obtain the remainder of the results. Result (l.ii) states that the agent's 
expected surplus is set equal to zero, equal to the agent's normalized level of reservation 
utility. Result (l.iii) is the membership condition where the membership fee, t/n, is equated to 
the expected cost of congestion that the additional principal or member imposes on others. 
These are standard agency and club results. 
3.2.3 EfTort is Not Observable 
Now suppose that there is an incentive problem, then the incentive compatibility 
constraint must be included into the principal's maximization problem. The problem then is 
as exactly stated earlier, as in (4). The first-order conditions are 
(7) 
(7a) t,; 
nv(t,) 71^ 
(7b) 
(7c) ^hbV(th) + n:^v(t,)-Cb =0 
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(7d) fi; 7thbV(th) + 7c„,v(t,)-Cb = 7t^v(tJ + 7t^v(t,)-C. 
where X and ji are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the participation and incentive 
compatibility constraints, respectively. From these first-order conditions, the following 
results are derived. The proof of result (2.i) is given in the appendix. The other two are 
restatements of the first-order conditions (7c) and (7b), shown here, for convenience. 
Result 2: Effort is Not Observable 
(2A) th > t, 
(2.ii) rty, v(t^ ) + 7C^v(t,) = Cb 
(2.m) - [Tty, nU„ (gh, n) + tc,^ nU„ (g,, n)] = — • 
n n 
Given the earlier assumptions, payment to the agent is monotone with respect to the outcome, 
and thus under imperfect observability with a risk-averse agent, there is risk sharing between 
the principals and the agent. This is the standard agency result. Result (2.ii) states that the 
agent's expected surplus is again set equal to zero, the normalized level of reservation utility, 
and (2.iii) is the membership condition where the right-hand side represents the expected 
membership fee. 
3.2.4 Comparison 
It is also of interest to compare the variables of central concern under the two 
regimes. To facilitate the discussion, let any variable with a single denote a solution to 
the principal's problem when actions are observable, and let a double asterisk, denote a 
solution under the hypothesis that actions are not observable. To start, note that when there is 
an incentive problem, because of the additional constraint required, a principal's expected 
utility when implementing the best effort can be no higher than his expected utility when 
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implementing the same level of effort when there is no incentive problem. The remaining 
results of the comparison are summarized below. 
Result 3: Comparison of the Two Cases 
(3.i) x" > T* where t = Uy^t^ for given levels of t^ and t, 
(3Ai) n"*>n*. 
The proofs for these results are in the appendix to this chapter. Result (3.i) states that the 
expected payment to the agent is higher when the agent's efforts are not observable than 
when the agent's efforts are - where the expected payment, x', is the fixed payment to the 
agent, t*. This represents the added cost to agency when an agent's actions are hidden. 
Finally, result (3.ii) is a result specific to clubs and to the club problem as laid out in this 
section. It states that when there is an incentive problem, membership will be higher than it 
would be otherwise. This result shows that the claim by Sandler and Tschirhart (1997), that 
agency costs raise the benefit of cost sharing and therefore leads to an expansionary bias in 
club membership, holds, at least for the present model. Given that higher membership leads 
to increased congestion, a higher level of n can be thought of as adding to the costs of 
agency, though this does not imply greater inefficiency or suboptimality since principals 
tradeoff the benefits to cost sharing with crowding costs. We now turn to a quite different 
model and explore how club membership may respond when the benefit to cost sharing 
among users is reduced. 
3.3 The Potential Effect of Advertising on Membership Size 
This section looks into the possible effect of an additional source of revenue, other 
than the charging of club fees, on membership size. This additional source of funds can 
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potentially be acquired from many different areas, but it is assumed here that the source of 
these funds is advertising revenue that the club receives in return for allowing firms to 
advertise to its members. Advertising, for example may play a significant role in clubs that 
seek sponsorship for its activities or in congestible networks, such as the Internet, where 
service providers seek additional means to cover network costs." As mentioned in the 
introduction, the addition of such revenue may actually serve to reduce the benefits of cost 
sharing, which therefore can lead to a reduction in club membership. Although such a 
hypothesis and result makes sense in a club framework, it seems somewhat paradoxical 
within a standard advertising context. However, this does not always have to be the case. 
Without crowding, indeed if a club has a more pure public good aspect to it, for example like 
television, this result may no longer hold since under such conditions, the network might 
desire as large an audience as possible. That is, as long as the costs of reaching them do not 
outstrip the benefits. Whether the following results still remain somewhat counter-intuitive or 
not, it is hoped that they at least point to the potential value of portraying clubs in a partial 
equilibrium setting and investigating the potential effects that may result from the club's 
strategic interaction with other players. 
This section looks at two models that are almost at the polar ends of the spectrum in 
regard to the types of firms manufacturing the private good and providing advertising 
revenue to a club. In the first case, the private good, x, is produced by a monopolistically 
competitive industry while in the second scenario, it is manufactured by a monopoly. In both 
instances, it is assumed that both types of firms believe it to be in their interest to advertise 
since advertising serves to increase the demand for their product The club for its part, offers 
an excludable public good and a means by which advertisers can simultaneously reach the 
80 
buyers of its product. In either case, the club provider should be thought of as a monopoly 
provider of not only of the club good or service, but also the medium by which the 
advertising can be conveyed to its users and purchasers of the private good. 
3.3.1 When x is Produced by a Monopolistically Competitive Industry 
In this first case, the club provider's decisions are explicitly modeled while the 
monopolistically competitive industry's decisions are not.^ Given the apparent discrepancy of 
power between these two industries, it is assumed that the club is acutely aware of its 
monopoly control of the advertising medium so that it is able to set the schedule of 
advertising rates it can charge. It is also assumed that the private good industry will respond 
to the schedule inelastically, in aggregate. Nonetheless, the club must be aware of the fact 
that it cannot simply and arbitrarily set its rates. That is, it will need to consider the effect of 
how the rates must not only reflect the benefits received by the users and members of the 
club, but also that they should be fairly based on the size of the receiving audience. Thus, the 
provider will, when choosing the amount of members to be allowed into the club, take into 
account how this decision impacts advertising revenue, network costs, and user well-being. 
The chief aim of these assumptions is to try to simulate as closely as possible, the 
process by which some media firms appear to undergo when attempting to attract advertising 
dollars. The amount they set for advertising spots must, in some way, be realistically tied to 
the medium's potential audience or membership, as well as to their tastes and other 
demographics. However, the analogy is not completely perfect, since if we took the example 
of a congestible network here, there can be a downside for the network (and for users) in 
attracting too many users of the resource in question. This may not always be the case with 
other media. 
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The structure of the game is as follows. There are three sets of players of interest; 
homogenous user/consumers, advertising private industrial firms, and the club provider. The 
provider, however, is the only player who explicitly behaves in a strategic manner. Within 
the context of our game, this means that the club provider explicitly takes into account the 
effect of its choices on the actions of the other players. The game is broken down into three 
stages. In order to solve the game, we utilize the standard concept of subgame perfection. 
The three stages are. 
Sta^e I: The club provider simultaneously chooses the advertising schedule (or function), 
A(n), and the number of users, n, allowed access to the club; 
Stage 2: The private industry responds by supplying the dollar amount of advertising revenue 
to the club for n users; and 
Stage 3: A representative club member chooses his or her consumption bundle of private 
goods, X and y. 
Note that due to our previous assumptions, the structure of the game can easily be 
represented as a two-stage game - it is only for the clarity of presentation that the game is 
broken down into three stages. 
We thus start at the last stage of the game and analyze the representative user's utility 
maximization problem. Assume first that the user's utility is quasilinear in the competitively 
provided numeraire good, y, and separable with regards to the other private good, x, and the 
level of provision of the club good, g. Taking as given at this stage, the level of advertising, 
A, measured in dollars, and the access fee, f^ along with the price of x, p, and the user's 
income I, the representative user's utility maximization problem is specified as 
(8) Maximize U = y + h(x. A) + u(g) 
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subject to y + px + f = I 
where h* > 0, h^, hAA < 0, and hxA > 0 For simplicity, it is assumed that the level of 
provision of club good, g, is fixed. This assumption can be seen as being consistent with 
conducting a short-run analysis of our partial equilibrium model. Also note that the derivative 
hA is left unsigned. The reason for this will become apparent later on. After solving the 
budget constraint for y and substituting the resulting expression into the objective fijnction, 
we can then derive the user's demand for the private good by maximizing the user's utility 
with respect to x. Since the utility function is linear in y and additively separable, the user's 
demand for x is a function of its own price and the total level of aggregate advertising, x = 
x(p. A). 
In stage two, it is assumed that the monopolistically competitive industry responds to 
the club's prior choices of A and n by supplying exactly the amount demanded by the club. 
Although not directly modeled, it is assumed that there are sufficient forces to put an upper 
limit on A so as to prevent exit from the x industry. 
At the initial stage the club provider simultaneously chooses A(n) and n."* The club's 
objective is to maximize the utility of a representative user while covering ail costs and 
taking into account the effect of its choices on both the private industry and the 
representative user's actions. One rationale for satisfying this objeaive is to ensure that all 
potential users have, at least, the incentive to join. That being the case, a user should at least 
receive a utility level no less than his or hers reservation level. Although a user's reservation 
utility, U, is not specifically incorporated into the model in the form of a constraint, the 
results of the upcoming maximization problem must eventually be checked against it, to see 
if this is indeed, the case. 
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The club provider faces two types of costs, C(g, n) and T(A). C(g, n) represents the 
typical club cost function where C(.) is increasing and convex in n. The cost function, ^(A), 
represents the costs incurred by the club, say, for designing or formatting, putting up, and/or 
storing the private industry's advertising messages and is assumed to be increasing in A. As 
in most of the club literature, exclusion is assumed to be costless. Also since the provider 
must cover its costs, it faces the budget constraint, 
(9) A + nf=C(g,n) + ^(A). 
Solving for f and substituting the result into the representative user's indirect utility function 
resulting from the solution of the user's maximization problem fi-om the third stage, we can 
now specify the club provider's optimization problem as choosing A(n) and n to 
Maximize 
I - px(p, A(n)) - ^ A(n)] ^  ^ 
The first-order conditions, before application of the envelope theorem, are then 
(10) A(.): (h.-p)-^-^3Vlll + h, =0 
(10a) n; 
5A n 
cx 5A (h, -p)-—— + 
dA dn 
(^A-1) 
+ h. 
dA C„ C + T-A 
'J- + . 
dn n 
=  0 .  
Using the representative user's first-order condition from stage three, we can rewrite (10) as 
(11) nh^+l = »I'^. 
The left-hand side of (11) represents the total marginal benefits to the club (from the point of 
view of all users), from advertising - the first term being the sum of the marginal benefits to 
club users and the second, the dollar in cost savings enjoyed by all members. The right-hand 
S4 
side is just the marginal cost of incorporating advertising into the club structure.^ 
Through successive applications of the envelope theorem, equation (11) reduces 
down to 
C„ C + ^ -A 
n =  0 .  
Rewriting this expression as 
n n 
we can see, ceteris paribus, that the standard average cost term for a club, C(g,n)/n, will 
exceed the marginal cost, Q,, of adding another user, so long as A(n) - ^ (A(n)) > 0 for all n, 
that is, as long as the network's advertising revenue always exceeds the costs of 
implementing the x-industry's advertising programs. In a similar club model without 
advertising, these two costs - the two terms on the left-hand side of (12) - would normally be 
equalized at the optimum and hence, the conclusion that membership will be lower with 
advertising than without. 
This conclusion, again, may seem paradoxical in that advertising payments made by 
the private industry may result in a decrease in club membership (though this is not quite the 
same thing as saying it results in a reduced audience). This is partly a result of the 
institutional and market structure (respectively) of the club and the private industry. 
Although this may not always be the case, but it is true here, payments made to an institution 
that engages in cost sharing, decreases that institution's need to attract more members. As 
regards to market structure, it was taken for granted that the x industry automatically 
responds with a flow of money equal to the club's demands for it, without taking into 
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account the effect that the flow of payments has on membership. With this in mind, we alter 
the institutional and market structure and turn to the case where x is produced by a 
monopolist who moves first and who has the power to determine the level of advertising 
expenditure. These assumptions enable monopolist to incorporate the club's responses in 
membership to changes in its choices of advertising. 
3.3.2 When x is Produced by a Monopolist 
Using the concept of subgame perfection, we start with the club provider's decision 
problem after it has already allowed for the representative user's optimum choice of x at the 
last or third stage of the game. Again the level of club provision, g, is assumed to be held 
constant, and in order to simplify matters a bit, we also assume that the club incurs no costs 
in implementing the monopolist's desired level of advertising. At the second stage then, the 
club's problem is to choose n in order to maximize the utility of a representative user, or 
(13) Maximize I - px(p. A) - —^+h(x(p,A),A) + u(g). 
n 
This leads to the following expression, 
(14) nC„(g,n)-C(g,n) +A=0 
which is similar to the result obtained above, C/n-C^ = A/n. Solving for n, we obtain n = 
n(g. A), the club's optimal response to the monopolist's choice in the level of advertising. 
Using the implicit function theorem, we then can derive the following comparative static 
fi-om (14); dnJdA = 
- l/(nCnn) < 0, which represents the effect of the monopolist's choice of 
A on club membership. From this comparative static, it is immediate that membership is 
inversely related to changes in the club's advertising revenues. 
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At the first stage then, we assume that x can be produced at constant cost, that there 
are no fixed costs, and that the monopolist incurs a cost of ot, per unit of the advertising 
dollar. The monopolist's problem is to maximize profits while choosing p and A while 
anticipating the responses of the club and users who consume x, or 
(15) Maximize TC = (p - c)n(g, A)x(p, A) - ocA . 
From which the following first-order conditions are derived. 
(16) 
(16a) 
nx + (p - c)n ox 
^ J 
= 0 
A; 
V d A j  v5Ay 
-a = 0 . 
We analyze each condition separately. Multiplying (16) by p/x and rearranging slightly gives 
p-c I (17) 
-T1 xp 
where = (ox/op)(p/x). This condition, that the price-cost margin is set equal to the 
reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand, is the familiar Lemer index of monopoly power. 
Turning to condition (16a), now written as expression (18) below, it is informative to 
interpret the condition before rewriting it in terms of elasticities: 
(18) (p-c)n 
\dAj = a-(p-c) dA X . 
The left-hand side of (18) represents the increase in the monopolist's profits due to an 
increase in advertising and is a result of a rightward shift in the aggregate demand curve of 
x.^ This however, must not only be set against the per unit cost of advertising, but also by the 
membership response of the club to the increase in its advertising revenue. From the previous 
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cxjmparative static, 5n/5A, as advertising increases, there is reduced incentive to retain 
membership at its current levels. This effect, reduces the advertiser's targeted audience. 
Finally, rewriting (18) in elasticity form, we obtain 
rtA (19) (P-C)[71^ +T1^] = 
nx 
where = (ox/5A)(A/x) and r|^= (on/6A)(A/n). Using (17) we can rewrite the above 
condition as 
(20) 
-Tlxp pnx 
Equation (20) states that the profit maximizing monopolist equates the ratio of its advertising 
costs to its sales revenue from club users to (r|^ + tIba ) /(~^xp)' ^^e ratio of the sum of the 
responses of users of x and club membership to a change in advenising expenditure by the 
monopolist, to the response of x to changes in its own price. Equation (20) is roughly 
comparable to Dorfinan-Steiner result which states that a monopolist sets the ratio of 
advertising expenditure to sales revenue equal to the ratio of advertising elasticity of demand 
to the price elasticity of demand (Schmalensee, 1972). The difference in (20) then from the 
Dorftnan-Steiner result. Is the need for monopolist to also consider the impact of its 
advertising revenue on club membership. 
3.4 Conclusion 
We have looked at two distinct circumstances in which a club's cost structure 
underwent certain changes and have analyzed these effects on membership. Under the first 
scenario, agency costs resulting from the principal-agent problem lead to increased 
membership size due to the increased benefits of engaging in further cost sharing among a 
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larger membership base. In the second case, we examined the impact of an additional source 
of club revenue used for covering club costs, and have shown that this can reduce the need 
for cost sharing among a pre-existing membership. Although each case is special, both 
demonstrate the usefulness of utilizing the concept of cost sharing when analyzing certain 
changes in the stnictxare of the club itself or in its environment. 
Proof of Result (2.i): 
When actions are not observable, we first need to show that both constraints are 
binding at the optimum, i.e., that > 0. We start by first assuming that A = 0. Given 
^ib < ^la' - 0 • ^d that we are assuming an interior solution, then in order for (7a) to hold, 
we need v'(t ) £ 0, which is contrary to our assumption of positive marginal utility. Now 
suppose that |i = 0 Then from (7) and (7a) we have; t^ = t, = t. But this violates the agent's 
incentive compatibility constraint since substituting t into 
results in Cb ^ C,. A contradiction, so p. > 0. 
Finally we can now proceed and obtain our result. Subtracting (7a) from (7) gives 
3.5 Appendix 
^hbV(th) + :Ctt,v(t,)-Cb > ;tb.v(tJ + 7c^v(t,)-C. 
1 1 
r 
nvXtJ nv^t,) 
Using TCy, > and tc^, < , we obtain 
1 1 
> 
nv'(tj nv'(t,) 
or v'(th)<v'(t,),  or t^ > t , .  
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Proof of Result (3.i): 
Because of binding participation constraints under both scenarios, we can show that 
expected payment for the agent's best effort is greater when effort is not observable than 
when it is. From these two constraints 
v(t-) = C, 
^hbv(tr)^7c^v(tr)=c^, 
we obtain 
v(t*) = + 
Using Jensen's inequality; Ev(t) < v(Et) if v" < 0, we can then write 
7ChbV(tJ + rCn,v(t,)<v(T) 
where x = Et = + Tt^t,. More specifically, 
v(t*) = TChfaVCtr) ^  ^ !bV(tr) < v(x") 
or t* < T**. 
Proof of Result (3.ii): 
In order to show that club membership can be higher when agent effon is not 
observable, we first draw some implications fi^om concavity of U(gi, n). Let 
EU(n) = TCy, U(gh, n) + U(g,, n) 
EU„ (n) = (g^, n) + 7c,bU„ (g,,  n). 
So by definition of concavity, 
(Al) EUCn**) < EU(n*) + EU„(n*)(n" -n*) 
(A2) EU(n*)<EU(n") + EU„(n*')(n* -n"). 
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Adding and rearranging (Al) and (A2), 
0<An[EU„(n-)-EU,(n-)] 
where An = n** - n'. Then if 
(A3) An<0, EU„(n')<EUjn'") 
An>0, EU„(n*)>EUJn~). 
Now turning to the membership conditions under the two scenarios, 
-[7Cy,n*U,(gb,n*) + 7i^n*U„(g,,n")] = -^ 
n 
mm mm 
-[7Chbn"U„(g^,n**) + 7t,bn**U„(g,,n**)]= 4;-,  
n n 
we can rewrite these as 
(A4) -n"EU,(n') = t* 
(A5) -n-^-EU„(n-) = x- . 
From (A4) and (A5), and using the resuk x** > t*, we can obtain the following inequality, 
(A6) 
n EU„(n ) 
Now suppose that n*^ > n*^, i.e. n' > n" or An < 0. Then from (A6), 
,  EU„(n*) „ 
EUJn ) 
or EU„ (n**) < EU„ (n"), a contradiction of one of the results, (A3), derived under the 
assumption of concavity. Thus n** > n*. 
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3.6 Notes 
' We ignore the implementation of the other **altemative" action. To fiiUy complete the analysis, one would 
have to compare the indirect utility of the representative principal imder both effort levels and the number of 
club members associated with each. However, for a given membership size, the level of effort that gives the 
representative principal the highest level of utility would be the most desirable level of effort that the principals 
would like to implement 
' For a rationale of treating network resources as congestible goods or resources, see MacKie-Mason and Varian 
(1994). 
 ^ With regard to not explicitly modeling the x industry, this may seem a bit unsatisfactory to some, yet this is 
done to simplify* the exposition of our main concern; an investigation into the impaa of changes in a club's cost 
structure on membership. However, we should mention that what we have in mind is a private good industry' 
with many firms selling differentiated products. SufBciently so as to warrant advertising, but only slightly 
enough so, as to define industry output and advertising as the sum of individual outputs and money* spent by 
individual firms. Impacts of changes in individual firm behavior are also assumed to be significantly small 
enough such that each firm ignores the effect of its actions on others. 
'* In a more formal presentation, one may want to limit the set of feasible advertising fimctions firom which the 
club provider can or would choose fiDtn. For example, if A is an element of a set of fimctions S. then A(n) ^  0 
for all a in a population of N candidates for membership. That is. the club requires that it receive non-negatrve 
advertising revenue. We may also want to define a permissible range of the functions, say that 0 < A(n) < A" 
for ail n e N. 
' Other things being equal, the term hA will be f>ositive here only if. at the margin. "Pa > 1- That is. the marginal 
cost of implementing the desired level of advertising is greater than the margiiial cost savings of receiving the 
advertising revenue. If on the other hand, there are minimal adv*ertising implementation costs, say when we 
have nhA +1=0, then h  ^< 0. Members would then be on the negative portion of their aggregate marginal 
benefit curve so as to fiilly capture the cost savings enjoyed by the additional outside source of re\'enue. 
 ^Using the first-order condition of the representative user's utility* maximization problem and the implicit 
fimction theorem, p - hx{x(p,A), A) s 0. we obtain cx/oA = - (hxA/h«) > 0. 
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CONCLUSION 
In models of voluntary provision of public goods, it is a well-established fact that 
unilateral action to contribute to public goods by an individual while facing ail the costs, is 
unlikely. In Mancur Olson's view, there is no getting around this result. Underprovision of 
public good can only be overcome through the use of selective incentives, coercion, or 
institutional arrangement. Since Olson's contributions, it has been fashionable to find ways 
that overturn this result, and under the right assumptions, this, no doubt can be accomplished. 
The first two chapters concerning common agency and partial cooperation, though 
utilizing a slightly different perspective and approach, followed a similar story line. A 
modified common agency model was used to investigate the impact of partial cooperation on 
the construction of agent incentives and effort in providing two collective goods. These 
goods had the special characteristics that each was independently related to the agent's 
actions but were public to one type of principal and private to the other. 
In addition, partial cooperation was introduced into the model through the assumption 
that only one type of principal (the smallest homogenous group of principals) was likely to 
form a coalition. Introducing cooperation in this manner allowed us to assume that some of 
the incentives for firee riding had been overcome. Yet, in the simultaneous case, we saw fi-om 
the organizing principals' perspective, that partial cooperation was self-defeating despite a 
strengthening of agent incentives and effort. In the sequential move game, it was shown that 
having a first-mover advantage over unorganized principals was not only individually 
beneficial to the cooperating principals, the outcome in terms of agent incentives and effort 
was constrained Pareto efficient, better than even the third-best, noncooperative outcome. 
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Thus, despite some moderately strong assumptions made along the way, these results 
demonstrate that partial cooperation can, but need not always be the panacea for improving 
efficiency. Results often depend on institutional detail and individual incentives. 
In addition, given the rather pessimistic result concerning partial cooperation in the 
simultaneous move game, we turned to investigating various remedies for improving 
efficiency. It was established by restricting principal punishments, that under certain 
circumstances, partial cooperation was capable of improving efficiency by delivering the 
second-best, but restricted outcome, at least for the organizing principals. We also looked at 
two other methods of achieving the second-best outcome. The first policy involved 
subsidizing the principals' marginal payments to the agent. But as shown, this method had 
the potential of being relatively wasteful in the use of the economy's resources. The second 
policy utilized a more direct approach, subsidizing the agent directly. The drawback in using 
this policy however, was that it required a bit more structure in terms of central planning and 
principal behavior. 
Finally, in a separate essay, we studied the relation of cost sharing and membership 
size within the fiamework of club goods. The intuition for this relationship is fairly 
straightforward and rested on the idea that with a given membership base and everything else 
held constant, a rise in costs increases the benefits of cost sharing while a fall, reduces them. 
The third chapter shows that at least in certain cases, this intuition holds, and as a result, 
depending on whether the benefits rise or fell sufficiently, one would expect to see a resulting 
rise or fall in membership. 
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